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By leaving the meaning of a statute—or procedural rule—undecided, 
ambiguous appellate decisions create space for lower courts to adopt a blend of 
conflicting approaches, yielding an average result that trims between competing 
preferences. While compromising in this way may seem to flout basic norms of 
good judging, this Article shows that opaque “compromise” opinions have 
plausible normative appeal, given premises about good interpretation often labeled 
“pluralist.” Judicial pluralists think courts should decide cases in ways interest 
groups would, hypothetically, accept. To demonstrate the pluralist appeal of 
opaque decisions, I develop, in turn, two related claims: First, interest groups, 
under the right conditions, would prefer that courts interpret ambiguous statutes 
(or procedures) in a way that compromises between contending interests, giving 
each side some of what it wants. Second, sometimes, interest groups would also 
prefer ambiguous appellate interpretations—creating space for a blend of 
conflicting lower court approaches—when that is the only form compromise can 
take. When both are true, opaque decisions have powerful pluralist appeal. 
Appreciating the pluralist appeal of opaque decisions, in turn, pays off by 
providing the missing normative foundation for some of the Supreme Court’s most 
confounding, inscrutable, and reviled procedural decisions: the Celotex trilogy, 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.  
INTRODUCTION 
Few Supreme Court opinions are as deeply inscrutable as Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.2 To state a claim, these decisions tell us, plaintiffs 
must plead facts that establish a “plausible” entitlement to relief.3 Yet, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 ∗  Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. Thanks to David Franklin, 
Andrew Gold, Mike Jacobs, Marla Kanemitsu, Song Richardson, Matt Sag, Josh Sarnoff, 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, and Mark Weber for helpful comments.  
 1.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 2.  129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 3.  E.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (holding that a complaint, to satisfy Rule 8(a), must 
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has explained so little about the content of this new “plausibility” test that, a year 
and a half after the Court’s decision in Twombly, Judge Stephen Williams noted, “I 
have yet to meet someone who knows what [the Court’s decision] means.”4 And 
it’s not the first time the Supreme Court has issued puzzling procedural decisions. 
Over twenty years ago, the Court, in the “Celotex trilogy,”5 altered federal 
summary judgment standards in a similarly perplexing way, replacing older, bright-
line rules with fuzzy, indeterminate tests that commentators describe as “cryptic”6 
and “obscure.”7  
While few have found something good to say about these decisions’ ambiguity, 
the claim developed in this Article is that ambiguity is, in fact, their greatest virtue. 
Given the universal condemnation of these cases’ murkiness, this claim may 
surprise. But celebrating unclear decisions is nothing new. From Griswold v. 
Connecticut,8 to Romer v. Evans,9 to United States v. Lopez,10 to District of 
Columbia v. Heller,11 the Supreme Court decides cases in ways that “leav[e] things 
undecided.”12 And when it does, influential minimalists cheer it on. 
While defending opaque cases is nothing new, defending Twombly or Iqbal 
requires developing a new normative case for opaque decisions—one that pushes 
beyond minimalists’ usual arguments. Minimalists say that the Supreme Court, by 
“leaving things undecided,” achieves a number of goods: it limits judicial 
intrusions on the political process, and, by remitting difficult questions to the 
political process, it paves the way for democratic consensus building about 
contested questions of constitutional law.13 
But murky procedural decisions can’t be explained in these terms. Fuzzy 
interpretations of procedural standards don’t limit judicial intrusions on the 
political process—they limit appellate intrusions on lower court discretion. Nor are 
opaque decisions a catalyst for consensus building about procedure. To the 
                                                                                                                 
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). 
 4.  Judge Stephen F. Williams, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Panel Discussion at the 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: Life Without Lawyers (Jan. 27, 
2009), available at http://app2.capitalreach.com/esp1204/servlet/tc?cn=aei&c=10162&s= 
20271&e=10392&&espmt=2.  
 5.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986).  
 6.  E.g., Martin Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of 
the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1356 (2005) (characterizing Rule 56 and 
Celotex in this way). 
 7.  Id. at 1344; see also infra notes 49–63 and accompanying text. 
 8.  381 U.S. 479 (1969). 
 9.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 10.  514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 11.  128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 12.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9, 23 
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided] (discussing Lopez and Romer); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
246, 267 (2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism] (discussing 
Griswold and Heller). 
 13.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 46–54 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]. 
2011] PROCEDURE’S AMBIGUITY 647 
 
contrary, they breed intractable disagreement among lower courts about the 
meaning of procedural standards.14 
The key to defending cases like Twombly lies, instead, with a different virtue of 
opaque decisions. By leaving a problem “to be worked out without authoritative 
solution,”15 as Learned Hand put it, opaque appellate decisions can also serve as a 
vehicle for compromise. They create space for lower courts to adopt a blend of 
different, conflicting interpretations of a statute (or procedure)—yielding an 
average result that compromises, or “trims,” between competing preferences.16  
While compromising, or trimming, in this way may seem to flout basic norms of 
good judging, opaque “compromise” opinions have plausible normative appeal, 
given premises about good interpretation often labeled “pluralist.”17 
Judicial pluralists come in many stripes, but share some basic beliefs: They 
think values are plural and incommensurable.18 In the face of conflict between 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindskopf, A 
Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 863 (2007) (finding that summary judgment practice both 
before and after Celotex has “var[ied] greatly in activity over time, across courts, and across 
types of cases”); see infra notes 146–53 and accompanying text. 
 15.  LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958). 
 16.  For a discussion of trimming, see Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1049 (2009) [hereinafter Sunstein, Trimming]. Sunstein presents trimming as an alternative 
to minimalism: minimalists leave things undecided, while trimmers, he says, reject leaving 
things undecided in favor of adopting moderate or intermediate positions. Id. at 1055–56, 
1080. As I show below, though, leaving things undecided in a minimalist fashion can itself 
be a trimming strategy. For a discussion of ambiguous decisions as a form of compromise, 
with a focus on pleading standards in securities law, see Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. 
Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory 
Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002). 
 17.  For a general discussion of judicial pluralism, see Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621 (1994). As 
discussed below, most academic minimalists are not pluralists, at least in the sense used in this 
Article, which emphasizes the need for judicial compromise between the claims of competing 
interest groups. For a notable exception, see Maimon Schwarzschild, Pluralism, Conversation, and 
Judicial Restraint, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 961 (2001). Like many scholars who might be classified as 
“minimalists,” Schwarzschild does not expressly claim the minimalist mantle. See Jonathan T. 
Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral 
Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1775–81 (2004) (discussing how many minimalists do not 
expressly identify themselves as such). Like all minimalists, Schwarzschild advocates that courts 
decide less rather than more. But unlike other minimalists, he defends this claim from an explicitly 
pluralist standpoint. Schwarzschild, supra, at 973 (“When courts decide fewer public questions, 
there is space for a more pluralistic patchwork of political outcomes . . . .”). To be sure, other 
minimalists, like Sunstein, occasionally discuss pluralist-sounding themes—emphasizing, say, the 
need to compromise between competing interests. See, e.g., Sunstein, Trimming, supra note 16, at 
1080 (asserting that “minimalists try to minimize the harm to losers, in a way that reflects a 
principle of civic respect”). Even so, Sunstein is generally hostile to pluralism as a normative 
model, at least in the form that is the focus below, and so has left the pluralist case for minimalism 
largely undeveloped. E.g., Merrill, supra, at 622 n.5 (noting that Sunstein “reject[s] pluralism as a 
normative model”). 
 18.  See Merrill, supra note 17, at 629 (“Some pluralists . . . think that . . . any statement 
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different versions of the good, they are hostile to institutional attempts to impose 
one set of preferences on those who do not share them.19 They think courts should, 
instead, show equal respect to contending interest groups.20 Their ranks include 
judges like Learned Hand and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.21 
In particular, pluralists think courts show equal respect to interest groups by 
deciding cases in ways to which those groups would, hypothetically, assent.22 To 
develop the pluralist appeal of opaque decisions, this Article, in turn, develops two 
related claims: First, interest groups, under the right conditions, would prefer that 
courts interpret ambiguous statutes (or procedures) in a way that compromises 
between contending interests, giving each interest group some of what it wants.23 
Second, sometimes, interest groups would also prefer ambiguous appellate 
interpretations—creating space for a blend of conflicting lower court approaches—
when that is the only form that compromise can take.24 When both claims are true, 
opaque decisions have powerful pluralist appeal.  
                                                                                                                 
about the common good reduces to a statement about the speaker’s personal tastes and 
preferences.”); see also EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET 
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 24–26 (2008) (noting that statutory interpretation must confront the 
fact that “we all harbor different conceptions of what the right thing is” and have no 
“independent basis” for determining which is correct); Schwarzschild, supra note 17, at 966 
(“[L]egitimate human values and goals are many, often incompatible, and not reducible to 
any single overarching principle or Good.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1544, 1554 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival] 
(contrasting republicanism, which “reject[s] ethical relativism” and “skepticism,” and 
“posit[s] the existence of a common good,” with pluralism, which views the notion of a 
common good as “mystical or tyrannical” and is, accordingly, “indifferent among 
preferences”).  
 19.  See, e.g., Schwarzschild, supra note 17, at 973 (suggesting that pluralists resist the 
“heavy social pall of uniformity”). 
 20.  See, e.g., ELHAUGE, supra note 18, at 25 (arguing that, given “reasonable 
disagreements about what is just and desirable,” the political and judicial process should 
endeavor to show “equal respect to all persons”). 
 21.  Pluralist themes are evident in Hand’s published writings and speeches. See Merrill, 
supra note 17, at 643 n.68 (“Hand too shared many of the tenets of what I have called 
ultrapluralism . . . .”). For discussion of Rehnquist’s pluralism, see id. at 631 (characterizing 
Rehnquist as an “ultrapluralist”). 
 22.  See, e.g., ELHAUGE, supra note 18, at 24–25 (claiming his pluralist interpretive 
theory is consistent with a “fundamental social contract,” under which courts must adopt 
interpretive approaches that satisfy the condition that “the expected good consequences 
outweigh the bad” for competing interest groups). 
 23.  “Interest groups,” as I use the term here, are not limited to organized lobbying 
groups. Rather, the term is used to loosely refer to any identifiable group of preferences that 
influence the enactment process, including the preferences of those who participate in 
legislation or rule making and the preferences of those who form the intended audience for a 
statutory (or procedural) enactment. In the procedural context, this includes not only 
organized lobbying groups for repeat-player litigants, like the American Trial Lawyers’ 
Association, or the Chamber of Commerce, but academics and others who contribute to, and 
influence, the rule-making process, and who have preferences distinct from repeat-player 
litigants, often informed by larger theories of procedural justice. See infra notes 217–33, 
246–77 and accompanying text. 
 24.  This idea is consistent with views expressed by some pluralists. See HAND, supra 
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Pluralism, in turn, provides the missing normative foundation for the Celotex 
trilogy, Twombly, and Iqbal. The pluralist case for compromise interpretations, I 
will show, applies with full force to the ambiguous Federal Rules governing 
summary judgment and pleading. And, ambiguous appellate interpretations of these 
Rules are, in turn, the only way to compromise between contending interests. This 
is true whether interest group conflict in the procedural arena pits trial lawyers 
against corporate defendants or involves competing views of procedural justice. In 
either case, the Celotex trilogy, Twombly, and Iqbal, by leaving things undecided, 
do what’s necessary to conciliate conflicting procedural interests. They serve 
important pluralist ends. 
The plan of the Article is as follows. Part I spotlights the Celotex trilogy, 
Twombly, and Iqbal. These decisions, I will show, leave much about the content of 
summary judgment and pleading standards undecided. Even so, the usual academic 
justifications for opaque decisions do not apply to them. How, then, can they be 
justified? 
Doing so requires a pluralist turn, and Part II, accordingly, lays the foundations 
of a pluralist case for the Celotex trilogy, Twombly, and Iqbal. The first half of Part 
II explains why, and when, pluralists think courts should compromise, or “trim,” 
between competing interests. The second half of Part II turns to show why opaque 
decisions sometimes appeal to pluralists as a trimming strategy.  
Part III returns to extend these claims to illuminate the Celotex trilogy, 
Twombly, and Iqbal. The final Part concludes. 
The argument that follows, finally, is not intended as a definitive normative 
brief for the Celotex trilogy, Twombly, or Iqbal. The goal is more modest: to 
unpack a possible normative case for decisions that seem, to many observers, hard 
to defend. As Michael Seidman says, “[o]nly after exploring the best possible 
                                                                                                                 
note 15, at 15 (suggesting that it may be best to leave deeply divisive issues to be worked out 
“without authoritative solution”); Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Apr. 2005, at 79, 90 (noting that Rehnquist, in the face of divisive debates, was “less 
theoretical . . . and [didn’t] attempt to impose a general methodology across the board.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Schwarzschild, supra note 17, at 966 (judicial 
pluralism embraces “the need for compromise and conciliation” between different versions 
of the good). The claim parallels those made by pluralists about political justice. Cf. ISAIAH 
BERLIN, POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1950), reprinted in LIBERTY 55, 92 
(Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (defending the need to show equal respect to different views 
through “logically untidy, flexible and even ambiguous compromise” that gives each some 
of what it wants).  
  Grundfest and Pritchard, in particular, anticipate some of the claims made below. 
See infra notes 139, 180, 193 and accompanying text. Their focus, though, is empirical—
they argue that legislative interest groups have incentives to muddy statutory meaning and 
that courts, in turn, have separate incentives, rooted in their own taste for discretion, to 
embrace ambiguous decision making, leading them to conclude that ambiguity “may have 
strong survival characteristics in our multi-branch legal regime.” Grundfest & Pritchard, 
supra note 16, at 636; id. at 649 (“Judicial tolerance of legislative ambiguity could . . . reflect 
a mutually advantageous exchange between the legislative and judicial branches.”). This 
Article combines some of their insights with pluralist theories of statutory interpretation to 
develop a new normative case that, under the right conditions, courts ought to engage in 
ambiguous decision making. 
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reasons why one might want to believe in [a judicial practice] . . . can we talk about 
whether one would want to hold such a belief.”25 
I. LEAVING THINGS UNDECIDED IN PROCEDURAL CASES 
This Part sets up the question that is the focus of the Article. As Part I.A 
explains, the Court’s controversial interpretation of summary judgment standards in 
the Celotex trilogy, and its interpretation of pleading standards in Twombly and 
Iqbal, leave much about those standards undecided. As a result, they bear some 
comparison to decisions celebrated by minimalists. As Part I.B explains, however, 
they do not fit minimalists’ standard justifications for leaving things undecided. 
Can they be justified?  
A. The Use of Ambiguity in Procedural Interpretation 
Drafted at the height of 1930s technocratic confidence in the ability of federal 
trial courts to manage adjudicative process, and in the spirit of progressivism’s 
distaste for the formalism of the common law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
depart from procedural codes of the nineteenth century by embracing vague, 
discretion-conferring tests.26  
Indeed, one can almost pick a page at random in any copy of the Federal Rules 
and find abstract texts, and the abstraction increases in those rules that regulate the 
pivot points in civil adjudication: pleading,27 amendment,28 compulsory joinder,29 
summary judgment,30 and control of the jury.31 Rejecting the formalistic 
nineteenth-century limits on amendment of pleadings, Rule 15 authorizes courts to 
grant leave to amend pleadings “when justice so requires.”32 Decades of labored 
interpretation make it easy to overlook the vagueness of Rule 56’s innovative 
authorization of summary judgment where discovery reveals no “genuine” issue for 
trial.33 Rule 8(a)(2)’s delphic requirement that a complaint must include a short and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25.  Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for 
a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1009 (1987) 
(emphasis in original) (making this point with a focus on the practice of judicial review). 
 26.  Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1967 (2007) [hereinafter Bone, Procedural Discretion] (“Case-
specific discretion has been at the heart of the Federal Rules ever since they were first 
adopted in 1938.”); Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 1794, 1795 (2002) (“Yet time and again, the Rules adhere to a pervading 
characteristic. The effort is less to provide detailed controls and more to establish general 
policies that guide discretionary application on a case-specific basis. . . . [V]ast discretion 
remains at virtually every turn.”). 
 27.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 28.  FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
 29.  FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
 30.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 31.  FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
 32.  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). 
 33.  See, e.g., Redish, supra note 6, at 1356 (noting that the text of Rule 56 is 
“reminiscent . . . of a cryptic pronouncement by the Delphic oracle” and “ha[s] been largely 
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plain “showing” of “entitle[ment] to relief” is no more self-explanatory.34 
Examples can be easily multiplied.35 
Sometimes, federal courts fail to explain procedural decisions. Up to a point, 
there is nothing questionable about that. Because each case is different and material 
differences are often so varied and subtle that they cannot be catalogued in 
advance, it is often difficult to specify the conditions for many routine managerial 
decisions, even those with significance for the parties. For that reason, decisions 
granting permissive intervention, for example, are famously opaque, to the point 
that existing precedent is “of very little value.”36 And, innumerable tiny and 
uncontroversial housekeeping decisions required by any civil adjudication—
extensions of time to serve a complaint or file a motion, for example—are issued, 
quite reasonably, without any explanation.  
In a few areas, however, the Supreme Court has formulated procedural standards 
in puzzling ways that spawn enormous controversy. Summary judgment is one. 
Pleading is another. Below, I provide an overview of the Court’s formulations of 
applicable standards in both areas. 
1.  The Celotex Trilogy  
Jonathan Molot observes that the Supreme Court “tends to announce broad 
principles in earlier cases only to revise and narrow them in later ones.”37 The 
Court’s summary judgment cases fit this pattern to a tee.  
In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,38 the Supreme Court severely limited the 
availability of summary judgment by requiring parties who do not bear the burden 
                                                                                                                 
irrelevant to the shaping of modern summary judgment doctrine”). 
 34.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 35.  The same can be said of Rule 11’s authorization of sanctions “suffic[ient] to deter” 
repetition of improper pleading, FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4); or of Rule 19’s directive that 
persons whose “interest” “as a practical matter” will be “impair[ed] or impede[d],” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i), must be joined “if feasible,” FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b); or of Rule 23’s 
condition that class actions for damages must be “superior to other available methods” of 
adjudication, and, indeed, many of the other requirements for aggregation, FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3); or of Rule 59’s permission to set aside a jury judgment and order a new trial “for 
any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted,” which does not define the 
level of generality at which previous permissions should be interpreted, FED. R. CIV. P. 
59(a)(1)(A); or of Rule 16’s broad authorization to trial courts to handle pretrial conferences 
in a manner that is “appropriate,” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2), and that facilitates the “just, 
speedy, and inexpensive disposition” of the action, FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(P). Rule 16 
converts many of the federal rules governing timing, sequencing, and even the subject matter 
of motion practice and discovery into discretionary default rules, so long as ad hoc, court-
ordered variations are approved with litigant input at a pretrial conference and comport with 
the latitudinarian requirements of modern due process doctrine. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
 36.  7C CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1913 (2d ed. 1986); Bone, Procedural Discretion, supra note 
26, at 1970 (asserting that in the procedural arena, “case precedent offers little constraint . . . 
because balancing tests and discretionary decisions are normally too fact-specific to support 
generalizations”). 
 37.  Molot, supra note 17, at 1833. 
 38.  398 U.S. 144 (1970). 
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of proof at trial to support a motion for summary judgment with evidence that, if 
uncontradicted, affirmatively disproves key elements of the nonmoving party’s 
claim—a burden that proved extremely difficult to meet, particularly in cases that 
turned on circumstantial evidence about state of mind.39 If defendants met that high 
burden, an influential series of lower courts had held in the 1960s (with tacit 
support from the Supreme Court) that plaintiffs only needed to present evidence 
raising a “slight[] doubt” as to the facts.40 Together, Adickes and the prevalent 
“slightest doubt” standard transformed summary judgment into a rarely utilized 
device.41 
Pushback began in lower courts in the late 1970s as trial and circuit courts 
proved willing to ignore prior precedent, particularly in the large, complex cases 
that began to crowd federal dockets in the late 1960s.42 The pushback culminated in 
the Supreme Court’s 1986 Celotex trilogy. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,43 the Court 
limited Adickes by, in effect, confining it to its facts, recognizing that a defendant 
can meet its initial burden by “pointing out” a lack of evidence in the record 
supporting the plaintiff’s claim, rather than affirmatively supporting the 
defendant’s own side of the story.44 And in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.45 and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,46 the two other prongs of 
the trilogy, the Court seemed to reject the “slightest doubt standard,” requiring 
nonmoving plaintiffs who bear the burden of proof at trial to come forward with 
“substantial” evidence raising more than a “metaphysical doubt”47 about whether a 
“reasonable” jury would decide in their favor.48  
Friends and foes of the decisions have noted that the trilogy’s “cryptic”49 and 
“obscure”50 language, while “interpreted by some to be defendant-oriented,” “sends 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39.  Id. at 158–60. 
 40.  The most influential articulation of the “slightest doubt” test is found in Arnstein v. 
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (applying the slightest doubt test in the course of 
refusing summary judgment against a suit by a plaintiff against Cole Porter for plagiarism). 
The Supreme Court gave tacit approval to a restrained approach to summary judgment in 
Poller v. Columbia Broadcast Systems, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 472–73 (1962). 
 41.  See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crises,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury 
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1023–24 (2003) (noting that until the late 
1970s and early 1980s, “the reported decisions reveal few cases of any complexity 
adjudicated under Rule 56”). 
 42.  Id. at 1028 (noting that there is some evidence that “lower federal courts were 
becoming more amenable to granting [summary judgment] . . . even before the 1986 
trilogy”); id. at 1048 (noting that “by 1986 summary judgment may have been undergoing a 
transition from its . . . disfavored status to one of greater judicial receptivity”). 
 43.  477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 44.  Id. at 325. 
 45.  475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 46.  477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 47.  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 588; see Redish, supra note 6, at 1334 (noting that 
Matshushita “seemingly adopt[ed] the ‘substantial evidence’ test”). 
 48.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
 49.  Redish, supra note 6, at 1356. 
 50.  Id. at 1344. 
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mixed signals.”51 Celotex, for example, “fail[ed] to provide clear guidance on what is 
required of the movant to satisfy the initial burden of production on a Rule 56 motion,”52 
and, indeed, is silent about the scope of the new burden’s availability. A big part of the 
problem is Celotex’s exceedingly cursory treatment of Adickes: Rather than explicitly 
overturning Adickes, or explaining how Celotex and Adickes fit together, then–Associate 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion states, cryptically, that “[i]t also appears to us . . . , on the 
basis of the showing before the Court in Adickes,” that Adickes reached the right 
outcome.53 And, in the wake of Celotex, some circuits have treated Celotex as an 
“unusual” case and have implied that, in ordinary cases, a moving party must follow the 
direction of Adickes, by coming forward with evidence disproving a plaintiff’s case54—a 
restrictive interpretation that recalls the “wariness (if not downright hostility) toward 
summary judgment [in the early Rule 56 case law].”55 Others, while giving broader 
scope to Celotex, have divided over the stringency of the showing that Celotex 
anticipates a moving party must make.56 
The vague phrasings of Matsushita are even more opaque.57 Because the Court’s 
application of the “metaphysical doubt” standard did not range beyond 
Matsushita’s unusual facts (involving a complicated antitrust claim), the decision 
does not “completely nail[] down” whether it is the slightest doubt or substantial 
evidence test that controls beyond its facts, or what, exactly, differentiates the two 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51.  Miller, supra note 41, at 1132–33. 
 52.  Id. at 1039. 
 53.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 
 54.  E.g., Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 607 (11th Cir. 1991). The Ninth 
Circuit took a similar, somewhat restrictive view of Celotex several years later. Nissan Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Fitz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). While these decisions 
reflect a minority approach to the defendant’s burden in reported decisions, reported 
decisions are notoriously poor indicators of the frequency or basis for summary judgment 
denials, and, in addition, some evidence suggests lower court practice is only loosely 
correlated with appellate interpretations of summary judgment standards. See, e.g., Cecil et 
al., supra note 14. The upshot is that much uncertainty remains about exactly how 
restrictively or broadly Celotex is being interpreted, on average, among lower courts. 
 55.  William W. Schwarzer & Alan Hirsch, Summary Judgment After Eastman Kodak, 
45 HAST. L.J. 1, 12–13 (1993). 
 56.  See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9–12, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 516 U.S. 869 (1995) (No. 95-198) (arguing that the Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have interpreted Celotex to place no burden on the movant, while the remaining 
circuits have retained some form of burden on the movant); see also Martin B. Louis, 
Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading, 
Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 
N.C. L. REV. 1023, 1048 (1989) (posing “the fundamental, unresolved question of summary 
judgment: What is the burden of production on the moving party, particularly the defendant, 
when this party will not have the burden of proof at trial?”); Adam N. Steinman, The 
Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years 
After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 104 (2006) (providing an overview of the 
“significant ambiguities with respect to both the moving defendant’s burden and the 
nonmoving plaintiff’s burden”). 
 57.  Redish, supra note 6, at 1350 (noting that neither the “substantial evidence” 
standard nor the “slightest doubt” standard are “self-defining”). 
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standards.58 Lower courts, as with Celotex, have varied in their interpretations of 
the case’s scope and effect, particularly where factual issues turn on proof of state 
of mind, credibility, or circumstantial evidence. Some courts continue to exhibit the 
traditional reluctance to grant summary judgment, while others claim broad license 
to grant summary judgment where, for example, inferences for or against the 
nonmoving party are “equally plausible,”59 or the nonmoving party has failed to 
raise concrete doubts about the credibility of the moving party’s witnesses.60 The 
Federal Judicial Center’s surveys of summary judgment practice have found, not 
surprisingly, that all summary judgment practice is local: disposition rates vary 
greatly from district court to district court, even within the same circuit, and even 
with respect to the same classes of claims.61 
While the Court might have clarified its rulings by siding with one of several 
highly theorized accounts of summary judgment burdens in the contemporary 
academic literature, it avoided doing so.62 To the extent that the Court explained the 
decisions in light of larger polices, the trilogy offered cross-cutting advice: 
encouraging the use of summary judgment in Celotex, while urging caution in 
Anderson.63 In the end, the trilogy is equivocal, providing fodder for both advocates 
and opponents of aggressive judicial use of the summary judgment device. 
2. Twombly and Iqbal 
The Court’s pleading precedents follow the same pattern as its summary 
judgment precedents. In early decisions of first impression, the Court announces a 
wide principle; in later decisions, the Court, in the face of changing circumstances, 
“revise[s] and recast[s] the principles it has announced in earlier decisions” in an 
obfuscating way.64 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58.  See id. at 1357. 
 59.  Daniel P. Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 491, 492 (1988) (“The Court’s ambiguous opinion in Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. might be read as suggesting that if the judge in an 
antitrust case finds the competing inferences of the plaintiff and the defendant to be equally 
plausible, summary judgment may be granted to the defendant unless the plaintiff is able to 
produce additional evidence.”). 
 60.  See, e.g., Bias v. Advantage Int’l, Inc., 905 F.2d 1558, 1562 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(noting that when plaintiffs haven’t raised concrete doubts about defendants’ witnesses, 
summary judgment is appropriate for defendants because plaintiffs are “not entitled to reach 
the jury merely on the supposition that the jury might not believe the defendants’ 
witnesses”); see also Miller, supra note 41, at 1064–65 (noting that post-trilogy, courts in 
certain types of cases “routinely weigh evidence . . . and make credibility determinations”). 
 61.  Cecil et al., supra note 14, at 863. 
 62.  See, e.g., Redish, supra note 6, at 1344. 
 63.  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 41, at 1132–33. The problem is exacerbated by the 
Court’s decision in Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992), which 
is inconsistent with an expansive reading of Matsushita to authorize summary judgment in 
cases involving equally plausible inferences from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., 
Schwarzer & Hirsch, supra note 55, at 6. 
 64.  Molot, supra note 17, at 1833. 
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A half-century ago, Justice Hugo Black, writing for the Supreme Court in Conley v. 
Gibson,65 instructed that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim which would entitle him to relief.”66 A literal reading of the opinion—a reading 
almost certainly intended by Justice Black, a great champion of wide, restraining rules—
imposed stringent restraints on the ability of lower courts to toss complaints that lack 
supporting factual allegations, since the instances in which it appears “beyond doubt” 
that the plaintiff will not prove any facts supporting his claim are rare.  
As with summary judgment, the pushback began in lower courts, as trial judges 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s demanded that plaintiffs include factual support 
for key allegations, particularly in complex litigation.67 It ended in the Supreme 
Court, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.68 Twombly grew out of a massive class action 
against the nation’s local telephone and DSL providers, which have enjoyed de 
facto monopolies for local telephone services since the break up of AT&T in the 
1980s.69 The complaint alleged that the defendants had conspired to restrain trade 
in the market for local telephone services by refusing to compete in each other’s 
territories and erecting a variety of barriers to access their markets.70 Although the 
complaint identified a series of actions that purportedly stemmed from this 
agreement, defendants argued the complaint failed to state a claim because: (1) the 
allegations of conspiracy were conclusory, and (2) the conduct identified in the 
complaint could be easily explained as the result of sensible independent business 
judgments by each defendant, without the need to posit a conspiracy.71  
The Court not only agreed dismissal was appropriate, but, in the process, it also 
rejected a literal reading of Conley’s broad “no set of facts” test, holding instead 
that the complaint had failed to allege facts giving rise to a “plausible” inference of 
conspiracy, since the facts alleged were equally consistent with conspiracy or 
innocent behavior.72 Twombly was immediately condemned, even by its supporters, 
as a “vague,”73 “less than pellucid,”74 “not entirely consistent,”75 even 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65.  355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 66.  Id. at 45–46. 
 67.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become 
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 72 (2007) (noting that lower court 
dissatisfaction with traditional pleading standards had led to an “extensive and confusing body of 
case law . . . as to when a case can be dismissed on the strength of the record as it stands before any 
discovery begins”); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 
988 (2003) (reviewing lower court practice in the 1980s and 1990s and concluding that while 
“federal courts recite the mantra of notice pleading with amazing regularity[,] . . . their rhetoric does 
not match the reality of federal pleading practice”). 
 68.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 69.  Id. at 549–50. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 552. 
 72.  Id. at 556–63, 570. 
 73.  Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern 
World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1110 (2010) (conceding that Twombly and Iqbal’s 
“plausibility” standard is “admittedly vague”). 
 74.  Robbins v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(“We are not the first to acknowledge that [Twombly’s] new formulation is less than pellucid.”). 
 75.  Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting Twombly “contains 
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“incoherent”76 opinion that provided lower courts with virtually no guidance about 
the content of federal pleading standards. And the criticism is just. Rather than 
defining what “plausibility” requires outside the special context of antitrust 
pleading, Twombly explained the plausibility requirement by piling on additional 
opaque abstractions: plausible claims are those that are non-“speculative,”77 and 
even if the facts seem “improbable,”78 they must demonstrate a “reasonably 
founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence” to support 
a claim.79  
To the extent the Court offered a meta-explanation of the decision, its statements 
cut in different directions. On one hand, the Court suggested the decision was 
motivated by concerns about expensive discovery in complex cases.80 But at the 
same time, the Court denied it was establishing a heightened pleading standard for 
cases involving expensive discovery.81 The Court also claimed its opinion was 
consistent with prior opinions rejecting lower court efforts to require fact-
pleading,82 such as Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,83 even though the employment 
discrimination complaint in Swierkiewicz states the claim in broad, conclusory 
terms. And it affirmed the validity of Form 11, which provides a model example of 
notice pleading in a hypothetical tort case arising from a car accident.84 Yet, in 
Form 11, a key legal conclusion—that the defendant “negligently” collided with 
plaintiff—lacks any supporting factual allegations. Even so, the Court refused to 
explain how the model complaint can be distinguished from the antitrust complaint 
filed in Twombly, in which factual allegations supporting another legal 
conclusion—“conspiracy”—were required.  
The Court’s subsequent attempts to clarify the decision—Erickson v. Pardus85 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal86—failed to do so. Erickson cited Twombly in support of 
“rejecting any requirement of factual detail in a lawsuit by a prisoner alleging cruel 
and unusual punishment.”87 Iqbal, in turn, granted certiorari to review the Second 
Circuit’s decision affirming denial of a motion to dismiss in a Bivens suit by a 
former “war on terror” detainee.88 Iqbal alleged that two high-ranking Bush 
administration officials, Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert 
                                                                                                                 
several, not entirely consistent, signals”). 
 76.  Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 867–70 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal’s two-
step analytical framework is “incoherent”). 
 77.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 78.  Id. at 556. 
 79.  Id. at 559 (alteration in original) (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 
336, 347 (2005)) (internal quotations omitted).  
 80.  See id. at 557–58. 
 81.  See id. at 569 n.14. 
 82.  See id. at 569–70. 
 83.  534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 84.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. 
 85.  551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). 
 86.  129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 87.  Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower Federal Courts—
Again, FINDLAW.COM (Aug. 13, 2007), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20070813.html 
(emphasis omitted). 
 88.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1939. 
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Mueller, had orchestrated a detention policy, in the wake of September 11, 2001 
(9/11), designed to discriminate against Muslim Arabs on the basis of religion and 
race.89 The Court reversed, holding the complaint failed to plead facts supporting 
the allegations that administration officials’ post-9/11 actions were motivated by 
“discriminatory animus.”90  
In some ways, Iqbal is broader than Twombly. The Court clarified two unsettled 
questions. First, it rejected claims by some commentators that Twombly was 
antitrust-specific.91 Second, it also appeared to reject characterizations of Twombly 
as a case in which the plaintiff had “pleaded herself out of court”—that is, had 
waived the protection of conclusory allegations by pleading supporting facts, 
exposing herself to dismissal if a court were to find that the alleged facts did not 
support the elements of the claim.92 
The Court did make more of an effort in Iqbal than it had in its extremely murky 
Twombly opinion to articulate the appearance of a test for adequate pleading, by 
describing a “two-pronged” inquiry.93 First, a court “can choose to begin” resolving 
a motion to dismiss by “identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than 
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”94 Second, the court should 
assume the truth of the remaining “well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and then 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”95 
Even so, Iqbal left a great deal undecided. It did not address how Swierkiewicz 
or the conclusory model complaint in Form 11 can be squared with the Court’s 
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal; indeed, it did not mention Swierkiewicz or Form 
11 at all. Iqbal’s discussion of plausibility remains self-consciously opaque. Rather 
than providing guidelines for assessing plausibility, Iqbal unhelpfully held that 
courts, when determining whether factual allegations rise to the level of a 
“plausible” claim, must exercise “context-specific” judgment, in light of “judicial 
experience and common sense.”96 Some language in Iqbal, moreover, suggested the 
Court was motivated by entirely case-specific concerns that litigation against 
government officials in the national security realm wastes “valuable time and 
resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of 
the Government” in an “unprecedented” national security “emergency.”97  
The Court also failed to explain how to distinguish conclusory from non-
conclusory allegations of elements of a claim. As Justice Souter noted in dissent, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89.  Id. at 1944. 
 90.  See id. at 1952. 
 91.  See id. at 1953. 
 92.  See id. at 1950. 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Id. at 1953 (“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the 
law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources 
. . . . The costs of diversion are only magnified when Government officials are charged with 
responding to . . . ‘a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the 
history of the American Republic.’” (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 
2007) (Cabranes, J., concurring))). 
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the Court’s treatment of some allegations (that “Ashcroft and Mueller ‘knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to’” the alleged discrimination)98 
but not others (that Ashcroft and Mueller “approved” the “‘policy of holding post–
September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions’”) as conclusory was 
mystifying.99  
On the face of the opinion, it’s even surprisingly unclear whether the Iqbal 
“two-pronged” test is always required. The Court did not say that a district court 
must refuse to credit conclusory allegations; it says that a court “can choose to 
begin” analyzing a motion to dismiss by disregarding conclusory allegations.100 If 
given its plain meaning, that discretion-enabling language—which has never 
appeared in any of the Court’s pleading decisions—suggests the possibility that, in 
some unspecified contexts, lower courts can ignore the Twombly/Iqbal “two-
pronged” pleading test, and allow complaints containing even “conclusory” 
allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, much as many circuits allow lower 
courts, in their discretion, to deny summary judgment even when it is warranted on 
the record.101  
Perhaps the Court had pro se complaints in mind. Lower courts have 
traditionally construed such complaints liberally, and Iqbal’s language arguably 
opens the way for courts to continue to do so. Or perhaps the Court’s use of 
permissive rather than mandatory language is inadvertent. Nonetheless, the 
language fits with the tenor of the opinion, which emphasizes judicial flexibility 
and discretion.  
Not surprisingly, in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, commentators are divided 
about the meaning of the decisions. Some—mostly defense counsel and opponents 
of the decisions hoping to raise the alarum in advance of a legislative pushback—
claim the two decisions herald a radical, defendant-friendly transformation of 
federal pleading practice, which effectively moves a “burden of proof” akin to 
summary judgment to the pleading stage across the board.102  
Others are more circumspect, suggesting that the decisions—beyond rejecting a 
rule-like formulation of notice pleading standards, which many lower courts never 
took literally to begin with—may do little to alter pre-Twombly lower court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98.  Id. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1951 (majority opinion)). 
 99.  Id. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Compl. ¶ 69, App. to Pet. for Cert. 
168a).  
 100.  Id. at 1950 (majority opinion). 
 101.  See Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary 
Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 94 (2002) (“[T]he 
trilogy, perhaps through the use of imprecise language, has created confusion as to a judge’s 
ability to deny an otherwise appropriate summary judgment motion.”). 
 102.  For a particularly overheated, pejorative version of this claim, see Ian Millhiser, 
The Biggest Supreme Court Case You’ve Never Heard Of, WONK ROOM (July 26, 2009, 
12:00 PM), http://wonkroom.thinkprogress.org/2009/07/26/iqbal. For a nuanced analysis 
which nonetheless argues that after Twombly, pleading and summary judgment standards are 
linked, see Epstein, supra note 67; Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with 
Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power 
over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217 (2008). 
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pleading practice.103 Before the Court’s decisions, many cases required plaintiffs to 
do no more than clearly identify, in rudimentary terms, the “event,” “transaction,” 
or “occurrence” precipitating the suit.104 Adam Steinman, in turn, has argued for a 
“transactional” interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal’s “conclusoriness” concept.105 
Under this approach, allegations are non-conclusory if they identify—even in a 
very general, rudimentary way—the event or transaction giving rise to the claim.106  
For example, under longstanding antitrust doctrine, bare proof defendants have 
consciously engaged in parallel conduct is not enough to trigger liability.107 
Steinman claims, in turn, that the problem with the plaintiff’s antitrust complaint in 
Twombly was not that the complaint had pleaded the existence of an agreement in 
bare terms.108 It was that plaintiffs had written the complaint in a way that obscured 
whether it was alleging that a “real-world” agreement had occurred independently 
of the defendants’ parallel actions.109 Steinman suggests that plaintiffs might have 
properly pleaded their claim through some simple rephrasing and editing: for 
example, they could have placed the allegation of a conspiracy before, rather than 
after, the allegation of parallel conduct and rephrased it in a way that clarified the 
parallel conduct derived from the agreement, not the “other way around”—
something that would have been easy to do.110  
In that case, Steinman argues, the allegations of conspiracy would have provided 
an adequate “transactional narrative,” one consistent with the elements of an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103.  See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298 
(2010) (“The only aspect of prior case law that Twombly and Iqbal set aside was a 
misunderstood fifty-year-old phrase whose real meaning was never called into question.”). 
 104.  See Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal 
Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 607–09 (2006); see also 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004) (“[P]leadings 
under the rules simply may be a general summary of the party’s position that is sufficient to 
advise the other party of the event being sued upon . . . .”). 
 105.  See Steinman, supra note 103, at 1298. 
 106.  Id. at 1343 (characterizing his interpretation as consistent with a “transactional 
approach” that “would require the complaint to identify the real-world events that give rise 
to liability”). 
 107.  See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
227 (1993). 
 108.  See Steinman, supra note 103, at 1343 (noting that “it would be a mistake to 
construe [the Twombly and Iqbal pleading] standard [to] requir[e] extensive details about the 
acts or events that are alleged to have occurred”); id. at 1345–46 (arguing that under the best 
reading of Twombly and Iqbal, the complaint must provide a plain transactional narrative of 
what happened, even if the narrative includes “cursory” allegations of key events). 
 109.  Id. at 1338 (arguing that the placement of the conspiracy allegations in the 
plaintiffs’ complaint “raise[d] questions about whether the alleged ‘contract, combination or 
conspiracy’ is grounded in any real-world acts or events” independent of the parallel 
conduct). 
 110.  Id. (arguing that the Twombly complaint miscarried because it “place[d] the 
conspiracy allegation after the parallel conduct allegations” and “phrase[d] the allegation in a 
way that suggest[ed] that the conspiracy derive[d] from the parallel conduct, rather than the 
other way around”). 
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antitrust claim, and the complaint would be “non-conclusory,” obviating the need 
to assess whether the remaining allegations suggested an agreement had plausibly 
occurred.111 In effect, under this reading, the flaw with the complaint was with the 
way it was drafted. And, as Steinman concedes, under his transactional 
interpretation, Twombly and Iqbal turn out to preserve the plaintiff-friendly 
orientation of the traditional notice pleading regime.112 
Other more ad hoc but lenient interpretations of the cases are possible. One can 
imagine an approach to plausibility that demands less factual specificity in cases 
that are not exceptionally “complex,” as the sprawling nationwide antitrust class 
action in Twombly was, or in cases that do not present concerns about the time and 
resources of high-level government officials responding to an unprecedented 
national security crisis, as in Iqbal. This view has been taken by a number of lower 
courts.113  
In the end, then, after the dust has settled, Twombly and Iqbal have replaced a 
broad, principled approach to notice pleading with an extremely murky standard 
that provides minimal guidance about how or even when to apply the standard 
beyond the specific, and fairly unusual, facts of either case. Whatever else may be 
said about them, one thing is clear: both decisions leave substantial room for 
variation among lower courts about the degree of factual specificity demanded.  
B. The Celotex Trilogy, Twombly, and Minimalism 
Jonathan Molot calls the pattern reflected in the Court’s summary judgment and 
pleading cases—in which the Court announces a wide rule and then, later, converts 
it into a murky standard in the face of changing circumstances—“backward-
looking” minimalism.114 Because minimalism offers the leading normative defense 
of opaque decision making, minimalist literature, in turn, might seem a natural 
place to mine justifications for these decisions. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111.  Id. at 1339 (“Had the complaint provided such an ‘independent allegation of actual 
agreement,’ it would have been accepted as true without regard to its ‘plausibility.’”). 
 112.  Id. at 1356 n.354 (noting that Steinman’s reading of Twombly and Iqbal “would 
preserve the fairly lenient pre-Twombly pleading regime”). 
 113.  This appears to be the view of Twombly taken by a leading treatise. See, e.g., 
JEFFREY A. PARNESSUPDATES & JERRY E. SMITH, 2-8 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§ 8.04[1][d] (3d ed. 2010) (“While simple claims might establish ‘plausibility’ under the 
Twombly standard using relatively broad, simple allegations, more complex claims will call 
for more complex allegations in order to establish ‘plausibility.’”); see also Robbins v. 
Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
the degree of factual specificity required depends on context; a simple negligence action may 
require little factual specificity, while complex cases involving massive discovery may 
require greater specificity to ensure the notice necessary to adequately respond to the 
complaint and prepare a defense); Steinman, supra note 103, at 1326 (“An alternative 
narrative—to the extent one is necessary—would emphasize the precise facts of Twombly 
and Iqbal rather than a broader doctrinal agenda. Indeed, Twombly and Iqbal were each 
rather exceptional cases.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 114.  Molot, supra note 17, at 1804.  
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Unfortunately, while Celotex, Twombly, and Iqbal share some minimalist 
features, they don’t fit the standard normative case for minimalist decision making. 
They are cases in search of a justification. 
Below, I develop these points. After clarifying some terminology in Part I.B.1, 
Part I.B.2 turns to explain, first, the sense in which Celotex or Twombly are 
“minimalist,” and second, why standard academic defenses of minimalist opinion 
writing do not lend support to the Court’s decisions. In the process, Part I.B.2 sets 
up the question that anchors the rest of the Article: If standard normative 
justifications for minimalist opinions can’t explain these decisions, what can? 
1. Minimalism: Descriptive and Normative 
The word “minimalism” is used in two different senses: a descriptive sense and 
a normative sense. In this Article, I use the term primarily in its former sense.115  
                                                                                                                 
 
 115.  Others have made similar distinctions. E.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a 
Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 
1955 (2005) (noting that Sunstein’s account of minimalism has “descriptive and prescriptive 
components”). Sunstein, however, has a tendency to conflate descriptive and normative 
minimalism, talking at times as though only decisions that leave things undecided in a 
normatively justifiable way are, in fact, “minimalist.” See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Testing 
Minimalism: A Reply, 104 MICH. L. REV. 123, 125 n.14 (2005) [hereinafter Sunstein, Testing 
Minimalism] (“[A] decision to the effect that people have a constitutional right . . . to avoid 
‘undue burdens’ on their medical choices,” while “leav[ing] many issues undecided,” should 
“not be treated as minimalist,” presumably because the decision threatens ambitious inroads 
on democratic decision making.). At other times, however, Sunstein is more careful to 
distinguish between descriptive minimalism and the normative case for deciding questions in 
a minimalist way; and, on balance, he seems to take the view that it is coherent to classify a 
decision as minimalist as a descriptive matter even if a court is using minimalism poorly or 
irresponsibly. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757 passim 
(2001) [hereinafter Sunstein, Order Without Law] (analyzing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000), as a minimalist decision, because it provided little in the way of explanation for the 
outcome, while criticizing the court for using minimalism irresponsibly); Sunstein, Testing 
Minimalism, supra, at 128 (“I have not argued, and I do not believe, that minimalism is 
generally or always the right path.”). 
  Even if Sunstein is occasionally hard to pin down on what exactly he means by 
“minimalism,” the term has taken on a life of its own. The term, as a descriptive label, is 
routinely applied by other scholars to a variety of decisions exhibiting opaque opinion 
writing that provides future courts with little guidance as well as to the theorists who 
celebrate such decisions. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 17, at 1775–81 (noting that the term 
“minimalism” lumps together “a variety of scholars whose views diverge as often as they 
converge,” including not only Sunstein but also Michael Seidman and Michael Dorf, who 
share an interest in cases that “postpon[e] resolution, or leav[e] matters unresolved, rather 
than [in cases that resolve] disputes based on principle in the manner that [Herbert] Wechsler 
envisioned”); see also Ronald Dworkin, Looking for Cass Sunstein, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 
30, 2009, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/apr/30/looking-for-
cass-sunstein (characterizing Lochner as a minimalist decision because it did not provide 
much guidance about its approach to due process scrutiny beyond the case at hand). 
Accordingly, even though my use of minimalism here may not accord with the speaker’s 
meaning, as reflected in Sunstein’s sometime-use of the term, it fits well within the range of 
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Used as a descriptive label, “minimalism” is not a synonym for “innocuous”—it 
refers to a deliberately opaque style of opinion writing which “postpon[es] 
resolution . . . leaving matters unresolved, rather than . . . resolving disputes based 
on principle.”116 Cass Sunstein, who coined the term, divides minimalist decisions 
into two types: those that do not clearly telegraph their import beyond their facts, 
which he calls “narrow,” and those that do not announce a deep, rich account of the 
underlying law, which he calls “shallow.”117  
Decisions that exhibit these features can stir controversy, strike down 
legislation, create confusion in lower courts, and invite litigation. Indeed, Sunstein 
treats cases like Griswold v. Connecticut,118 United States v. Lopez,119 Bush v. 
Gore,120 and Romer v. Evans121—cases that did all three—as “insistently 
minimalist.”122  
Romer, for example, struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment, adopted 
by state referendum, that denied homosexuals status as a “protected” class for 
“claim[s] of discrimination.”123 The Court eschewed analyzing the case through the 
lens of heightened equal protection scrutiny applicable to discrimination based on 
race or gender, holding, instead, that the amendment failed rational basis scrutiny 
because it reflected constitutionally unacceptable “animus” toward same-sex 
couples.124 But the Court failed to identify “[w]hat precisely [constitutionally 
impermissible] ‘animus’” is.125 On this point, the Court’s reasoning was opaque, 
puzzling.126 Offering virtually no explanation of the concept, the Court “impose[d] 
unusually few constraints on its own interpretation,”127 leaving its meaning to “the 
future.”128 At the same time, Romer pointedly ignored Bowers v. Hardwick,129 a 
prior precedent upholding a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, which seemed 
to recognize that states can express disapproval toward (and indeed criminalize) 
same-sex relationships.130 “An important aspect of the Court’s minimalism—
indeed, subminimalism—consists in its failure to” explain the concept of 
                                                                                                                 
its conventional semantic meaning. 
 116.  Molot, supra note 17, at 1781. 
 117.  SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 13, at 10–14. 
 118.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 119.  514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 120.  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 121.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 122.  Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 12, at 100; see also Sunstein, 
Order Without Law, supra note 115, at 758 (characterizing Bush v. Gore as minimalist). 
 123.  COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, held unconstitutional by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
 124.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
 125.  Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 12, at 60 (noting that the difficulty 
lies in identifying “[w]hat precisely . . . ‘animus’” is). 
 126.  Id. at 9 (“The Court’s puzzling and opaque opinion is not satisfying from the 
theoretical point of view . . . .”). 
 127.  Id. at 64. 
 128.  Id. at 27 (“The ultimate meaning of Romer v. Evans . . . —[a] possible one-way 
ticket[], [a] possible seminal case[]—will depend on the future.”). 
 129.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 130.  Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 12, at 64–65. 
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impermissible animus or “say anything about how Romer and Hardwick fit 
together.”131  
Similarly, Griswold, which unexpectedly recognized a free-floating 
constitutional right to sexual privacy, is minimalist because the Court “did not 
adopt a theoretically ambitious understanding of privacy or offer a great deal of 
guidance about the scope of the right.”132 United States v. Lopez,133 which shocked 
commentators by striking down legislation under the Commerce Clause for the first 
time in decades, was minimalist because it “turned on a set of factors, not on a 
broadly applicable rule, and it gave no deep account of federalism.”134 Bush v. 
Gore,135 handed down like a “bolt from the blue,”136 was minimalist because it 
“decide[d] the case at hand, without making many commitments for the future,” 
and indeed was subminimalist, in the sense that the Court “said less than is required 
to justify the . . . outcome.”137  
Minimalism is also used in a “normative” sense, that is, as a label for a cluster of 
well-worn claims about the advantages of narrow and shallow decisions and the 
academics who make these claims. In particular, as Jonathan Molot notes, 
normative minimalists “focus on the risk of judicial overreaching and the need to 
prevent, or at least reduce, judicial intrusions upon the political process.”138 By 
leaving things undecided when reviewing the constitutionality of political branch 
acts, these minimalists contend, courts muddy the larger import of their decisions, 
putting the most divisive, far-reaching questions to one side and allowing them to 
continue to be worked out democratically.  
Normative minimalists typically link these claims with an optimistic view of 
democratic deliberation. Democratic debate, they say, is a catalyst for social 
consensus about contested questions of political justice. Sunstein, for example, 
believes that, under the right conditions, an inclusive process of deliberation in 
which people with many different views participate distances people from their 
biases, allowing them to reach agreement about difficult political questions.139 As a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131.  Id. at 65. 
 132.  Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism, supra note 12, at 267. To be sure, 
Sunstein does argue that Griswold, even if it was unexpected in light of prior precedent, 
conformed the law to popular expectations about the scope of the right to privacy. See id. at 
261–62. The same, however, cannot plausibly be claimed about United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995). Moreover, Sunstein clearly treats Griswold’s conformity with popular 
expectations as a normative defense of the decision, and not as a definitional characteristic of 
“decisional minimalism.” See Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism, supra note 12, at 
261 (suggesting that, while Griswold itself offered only a shallow explanation of the 
decision, and therefore qualifies as “minimalist” in a decisional sense, a deeper normative 
account of the outcome in Griswold would draw on the fact that the law in question violated 
settled public expectations about the scope of sexual privacy). 
 133.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. 
 134.  Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 12, at 23. 
 135.  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 136.  Sunstein, Order Without Law, supra note 115, at 765. 
 137.  Id. at 757. 
 138.  Molot, supra note 17, at 1777. 
 139.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 
1548–49 (1988). 
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result, he celebrates narrow and shallow decisions in public law contexts most of 
all. There, by “saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as 
much as possible undecided,” courts “promote more democracy,” and therefore 
“more deliberation,” creating space for democratic consensus building about 
contested public law questions—be it same-sex equality in Romer, federal power in 
Lopez, or sexual privacy in Griswold.140  
2. Celotex, Twombly, and Minimalism:  
Points of Descriptive Comparison and Normative Contrast 
The field of descriptively minimalist decisions is broad. Descriptive minimalism 
is a relative, not an absolute, concept, and many decisions have descriptively 
minimalist—or what I will, going forward, call just plain “minimalist”—features. 
The Celotex trilogy, Twombly, and Iqbal fit comfortably in that field. Like Romer, 
Griswold, Lopez, and Bush v. Gore, they deploy “conclusory,” “opaque” tests with 
imprecise context—“plausibility” or Matsushita’s “metaphysical doubt” test—that 
provide little guidance for the future and impose “unusually few constraints on 
[their] . . . interpretation.”141  
To be sure, all of these decisions could have been narrower and shallower still. 
In Twombly, the Court might have ruled even more narrowly, by expressly 
confining its opinion to the antitrust context. The Celotex trilogy and Iqbal are 
wider than Twombly in the sense that they self-consciously announce general tests 
that will apply in many cases, but are also shallow, because the tests announced 
(plausibility, Matsushita’s “metaphysical doubt” standard) have extremely fuzzy 
content and so are susceptible of both permissive and restrictive interpretations 
beyond their facts. 
But the same can be said of other minimalist decisions. Romer, too, is wider 
than other imaginable decisions (for example, a decision demanding legislative 
findings supporting the government’s proffered interest in freeing up resources for 
combating other forms of discrimination). Lopez, too, self-consciously announces a 
general framework for analyzing Commerce Clause cases, although its framework 
is susceptible of both narrow and broad applications. As is almost invariably true of 
descriptively minimalist decisions, the Celotex trilogy, Twombly, and Iqbal, like 
Romer or Lopez, are not maximally narrow or shallow, but tend toward the narrow 
and shallow end of the continuum.  
Some might object that decisions are not minimalist because they do not 
“restrain” lower courts—rather, they blur limits on trial judges inclined to use 
summary judgment and motions to dismiss aggressively. But minimalism is not 
synonymous with “restraint.”142 What qualifies decisions like Griswold or Lopez or, 
for that matter, Twombly as minimalist is not that they restrain judicial “power” to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140.  SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 13, at 3–4. 
 141.  See Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 12, at 27, 64 (describing 
Romer in similar terms); see also supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 142.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS 
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 44 (2005) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES] 
(“[B]ecause of their defining creed,” Sunstein notes, minimalists “are not systematic 
believers in restraint.”). 
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“take action,” but rather that they “postpon[e] resolution” of important questions, 
“leaving matters unresolved, rather than . . . resolving disputes” based on wide, 
deep, and easily generalizable principles.143  
Iqbal, Twombly, and the Celotex trilogy do not, however, fit the paradigmatic 
normative case for minimalism. First, the procedural cases reviewed above are not 
democracy reinforcing in the way that is characteristic of nearly every decision 
celebrated by those who defend minimalism. Their effect is entirely intrabranch: By 
rejecting a broad and deep account of summary judgment and pleading, the 
decisions reduce appellate intrusions on lower court discretion, rather than “judicial 
intrusions upon the political process.”144  
Second, and relatedly, while minimalist constitutional decisions are defended as 
way stations to eventual convergence around shared legal principles, reached 
through democratic deliberation,145 the decisions above can’t plausibly be defended 
that way. Indeed, the twenty-five-year experience with Celotex suggests that 
minimalist procedural decisions entrench—indefinitely—heterogeneous procedural 
practices in lower courts. 
The point is vividly illustrated by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study 
examining summary judgment practice between 1975 and 2000, which provides a 
decent picture of the trilogy’s effects on summary judgment filing and disposition 
rates across the federal system.146 
The data, drawn from 15,000 docket sheets in randomly sampled terminated 
cases in six district courts, are in some ways surprising, given the rhetoric 
surrounding the trilogy. After controlling for differences in filing rates across 
circuits and for changes over time in the types of cases filed, the FJC found that 
“the likelihood that a case contained one or more motions for summary judgment 
increased before the Supreme Court trilogy, from approximately 12 percent in 1975 
to 17 percent in 1986, and has remained fairly steady at approximately 19 percent 
since that time.”147 Even more surprising, between 1975 and 2000, “no statistically 
significant changes over time were found in the outcome of defendants’ or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143.  Molot, supra note 17, at 1781. It is also true that the Celotex trilogy, Twombly, and 
Iqbal involve standards that are applied very frequently—indeed, they count as some of the 
most frequently cited Supreme Court cases of all time. See Hoffman, supra note 102, at 
1222. But, the fact that a decision presents frequent opportunities for its application does not 
bar assigning it the minimalist label, as a descriptive matter. Like Bush v. Gore’s 
announcement of a requirement of equal treatment of votes, the Celotex trilogy, Twombly, 
and Iqbal announce standards (in Matsushita, the “metaphysical doubt” standard for 
satisfying the nonmoving party’s summary judgment burden, and in Twombly and Iqbal, 
plausibility pleading) whose potential field of application “extends well beyond the context” 
of the case at hand. Sunstein, Order Without Law, supra note 115, at 770. Yet, each of these 
decisions—because they do not clearly forecast the implications of that standard beyond the 
cases at hand—remain descriptively minimalist. 
 144.  See, e.g., Molot, supra note 17, at 1777 (noting that minimalists characteristically 
focus on decisions that “prevent, or at least reduce, judicial intrusions upon the political 
process”). 
 145.  See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
 146.  See Cecil et al., supra note 14, at 861. 
 147.  Id. at 861 (emphasis in original). 
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plaintiffs’ summary judgment motions, again after controlling for differences 
across courts and types of cases.”148 
Even so, the FJC also found something that some find alarming: before and after 
the trilogy, summary judgment filing and disposition rates varied significantly from 
circuit to circuit and between types of cases, a finding that replicates those of 
previous studies.149 To take one example drawn from parallel data collected by 
Stephen Burbank, the summary judgment termination rate in the District of 
Columbia (22%) was nearly five times the highest rate in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania (4.7%) over the same four-year period.150 
Thus, while the FJC study offers surprisingly little support for claims that the 
trilogy radically changed federal summary judgment practice, it does underscore 
that the Celotex trilogy embraced, and even entrenched, the preexisting 
heterogeneity of summary judgment practice among lower courts. In effect, rather 
than promoting uniform lower court practice, the Court’s fuzzy interpretation of 
summary judgment standards provides cover for disparate, often conflicting 
approaches to summary judgment practice across district courts.  
While solid empirical work on pre-Twombly filing and disposition rates for 
motions to dismiss is, to date, lacking, anecdotal evidence is suggestive of the same 
pattern: Even as far back as the mid-1980s, when the Court decided the Celotex 
trilogy, commentators complained that trial courts in some jurisdictions were using 
motions to dismiss in disparate, inconsistent ways—some adhering to the 
traditional reluctance to demand factual specificity in initial pleadings, others 
demanding more stringent factual allegations in support of claims.151 Those 
complaints only increased in the years preceding Twombly.152 The FJC’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148.  Id. at 862; see also id. at 896. Indeed, despite anecdotal claims that Celotex 
prompted a significant increase in summary judgment in civil rights cases, the authors found 
“no evidence that the likelihood of a summary judgment motion or termination by summary 
judgment has increased” in civil rights case since 1986. Id. at 905–06. To be sure, caution is 
appropriate when assessing the take-away value of the FJC’s study. For example, because 
the FJC study codes the substantive nature of the decisions included in the study in broadly 
defined categories (tort, contract, civil rights), it does not shed light on the effect of summary 
judgment at a microlevel (i.e., in products liability actions or Title VII cases). See id. at 904 
(“Future studies should examine separately product liability cases . . . to determine if the 
pattern of findings is consistent across all types of torts cases.”). 
 149.  See id. at 883–86 (discussing “great variation across courts and across types of 
cases”); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal 
Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 
593 (2004) (noting data, as of 2004, that suggest “substantial variability” in rates of 
summary judgment across different parts of the country). 
 150.  See Burbank, supra note 149, at 593. 
 151.  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 180 (1985) 
(noting a trend in some circuits toward requiring more factual specificity in complaints). 
 152.  See Fairman, supra note 67, at 988 (“[In 2003,] federal courts recite the mantra of 
notice pleading with amazing regularity. However, their rhetoric does not match the reality 
of federal pleading practice. Sometimes subtle, other times overt, federal courts in every 
circuit impose non-Rule-based heightened pleading in direct contravention of notice 
pleading doctrine.”); see also Epstein, supra note 67, at 72 (“Notwithstanding the liberal 
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules, an extensive and confusing body of case law has 
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preliminary study of post-Iqbal dismissal rates, in turn, finds that, while it is too 
early to make confident predictions about the impact of Twombly or Iqbal, 
“[o]verall” the evidence so far “does not appear to indicate a major change in the 
standards used to evaluate the sufficiency of complaints” among lower courts.153  
The upshot is that what was true of Celotex appears true of Twombly and Iqbal: 
the Supreme Court’s decisions intervene against a set stage of heterogeneous lower 
court practice and, to date, all that may be confidently said about Twombly and 
Iqbal is that they, like the Celotex trilogy before them, provide formal cover for 
that heterogeneity.154  
In the end, then, the standard normative case for minimalism, with its emphasis 
on democracy reinforcement and consensus building, can’t justify these decisions. 
What can?  
II. PLURALISM AND MINIMALISM  
As the last Part underscored, developing a plausible defense of Celotex and 
Twombly requires stepping beyond the usual justifications offered for opaque, 
minimalist decisions and developing a new way of defending these kinds of cases. 
The next two Parts develop that defense. Part II.A begins with some ground 
clearing, reviewing the link between the standard defense of minimalist decisions 
                                                                                                                 
developed as to when a case can be dismissed on the strength of the record as it stands before 
any discovery begins.”). 
 153.  Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman to Civil Rules Comm. and Standing Rules 
Comm. Concerning the “Application of Pleading Standards Post-Ashcroft v. Iqbal,” at 2–3 
(Nov. 25, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Memo%20re%20pleading%20 
standards%20Nov30.pdf. In addition, Joseph Grundfest and Adam Pritchard’s study of 
judicial application of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s ambiguous pleading 
standards throughout the 1990s only reinforces the likelihood that lower courts will apply 
Twombly and Iqbal in inconsistent ways. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 16, at 667–
75 (detailing the array of inconsistent approaches both across and within circuits and noting 
a trend toward “intermediate” interpretations). 
 154.  There are, moreover, good structural reasons for questioning strong claims that 
Twombly or Iqbal will have a radical effect on the evolution of future lower court practice. 
Most trial court decisions, including grants of partial summary judgment and partial motions 
to dismiss, are not immediately appealable—and the pervasiveness of settlement means 
many of these decisions are never appealed. Intermediate appellate courts, moreover, affirm 
trial court decisions at an incredibly high rate. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 150–52 (2002) (finding an 80% 
affirmance rate in civil appeals). And the Supreme Court, which takes only about eighty 
appeals each year, has a dramatically limited capacity to police the innumerable summary 
judgment or Rule 12(b)(6) dispositions made daily throughout the federal court system. The 
upshot is that trial courts, as a practical matter, have long had wide discretion to decide even 
pivotal motions, like summary judgment motions or motions to dismiss, with relatively light 
appellate oversight. The structure of appellate review, in short, ensures that predictions about 
the influence of ambiguous high court decisions like Celotex or Twombly are hazardous, at 
best. See Burbank, supra note 149, at 620–21 (“Lower federal courts do not require a 
Supreme Court decision to get what they need out of a Federal Rule, and, particularly given 
the Court’s declining appetite for work, they may not feel they can wait. . . . The law of 
action does not wait for the law in books.” (citation omitted)). 
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and the controversial civic republican commitments of minimalism’s leading 
defender, Sunstein. 
Fuzzy, minimalist procedural decisions, I argue in Part II.B, reflect a set of 
commitments at odds with the republican emphasis in most defenses of 
minimalism: pluralism. Part II.B.1 reviews the basic commitments that define 
pluralism. Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3 explain that, under the right circumstances, 
pluralists believe courts should adopt interpretations of ambiguous statutes that 
compromise between contending interests. In Part II.B.4, I turn to explain why, in 
some cases, the only way a court can compromise is through a minimalist 
decision—one that leaves much about the meaning of an ambiguous statute 
undecided. Part II.B.5 pulls many strands together, before returning to examine the 
Celotex trilogy, Twombly, and Iqbal, by summarizing the pluralist case for opaque, 
minimalist decisions. 
A. Minimalism as Strategic Republicanism 
Sunstein’s account of minimalism is famously undertheorized155—and self-
consciously so. Minimalism, he says, is premised on a degree of skepticism about 
the utility of ambitious theorizing and on pessimistic epistemic claims about the 
abilities of judges. Many legal debates about high theory, he argues, are 
“hopelessly sterile—conceptualistic, terminological, interminable.”156 Worse still, 
“[j]udges are not . . . trained as philosophers, and judges who make theoretically 
ambitious arguments may well make mistakes that are quite costly.”157 The upshot, 
Sunstein argues, is that constitutional theory should embrace, rather than challenge, 
lawyers’ traditional skepticism about theory—counseling instead a spirit of judicial 
humility, which is “‘not too sure that it is right.’”158  
Even so, it’s hard to take Sunstein completely at his word, as his own account of 
minimalism reflects his distinctive commitment to civic republicanism. Civic 
republicans believe that the political process should serve the “common good.”159 
As a result, they believe that distribution of entitlements should be undertaken 
according to “neutral” principles—meaning that entitlements should be distributed 
based on general, public-regarding reasons that exclude factional considerations 
like religion or political affiliation.160 Those principles, moreover, must reflect 
“agreement” reached “among political equals.”161 In other words, republicans seek 
to ground a distribution of entitlements based on criteria that are broad, deep, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155.  See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 115, at 1957 (“Professor Sunstein is, in fact, 
notoriously ambiguous about what he means by ‘minimalism.’”). 
 156.  SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 13, at 252–53. 
 157.  Id. at 256. 
 158.  SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES, supra note 142, at 35 (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE 
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1954)). 
 159.  Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 18, at 1554 (“[R]epublican approaches 
posit the existence of a common good, to be found at the conclusion of a well-functioning 
deliberative process.”). 
 160.  Id. at 1568. 
 161.  Id. at 1554 (noting that republicans define “substantively correct outcomes” as 
those that satisfy “the ultimate criterion of agreement among political equals”). 
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reflect wide social consensus about the “common good” reached through 
participatory means. 
Institutions that facilitate publically accountable “dialogue and deliberation” do 
the best at producing consensus about neutral principles, for two reasons: (1) 
dialogue and deliberation distance people from their parochial biases;162 and (2) 
public accountability ensures that deliberation will not be corrupted by powerful 
interest groups.163 Together, republicans think, deliberation and accountability 
ensure a distribution of entitlements based on truly neutral, public-regarding 
reasons. Accordingly, civic republicans seek to expand opportunities for 
democratic debate about what justice requires and, relatedly, to regulate that debate 
to ensure it approaches, as closely as possible, an inclusive, deliberative ideal.164  
Sunstein’s republican commitments explain, in turn, the characteristic points of 
emphasis in his defense of minimalism: democracy reinforcement and consensus 
building. By avoiding resolving “fundamental questions” about constitutional 
rights, courts ensure those questions will continue to be worked out in democratic 
fora at the state and federal levels, where democracy can, in turn, foster wide 
agreement about how to resolve contested public law questions.165 In effect, 
minimalism ensures courts are partners in the republican project. 
B. Minimalism for Pluralists 
There is no gainsaying the importance of Sunstein’s account of minimalism. 
Even so, the success of Sunstein’s account has had a perverse effect, by blinding 
subsequent commentators to the value of “leaving things undecided” in cases that 
do not fit the tidy model of Sunstein’s minimalism—that is, in cases where doing 
so is not democracy reinforcing and can’t plausibly be defended as a strategy for 
promoting social consensus about principles of justice. Commentators, in effect, 
often act as though leaving things undecided has normative value only if doing so 
jibes with Sunstein’s distinctive normative commitments. 
In fact, there is a plausible case to be made for judicial decisions with minimalist 
features outside the standard democracy-reinforcing context in which minimalism 
                                                                                                                 
 
 162.  Id. at 1548–49 (explaining that deliberation allows “political actors to achieve a 
measure of critical distance from prevailing desires and practices, subjecting these desires 
and practices to scrutiny and review”). 
 163.  See id. at 1584 (noting that republicans prefer that decisions be made by those “who 
are politically accountable and highly visible”). 
 164.  Id. at 1549 (explaining that republicans “may well attempt to insulate political 
actors from private pressure; and they may also favor judicial review designed to promote 
political deliberation and perhaps to invalidate laws when deliberation has not occurred”). 
Sunstein, in particular, has emphasized the possibility that democratic deliberation can not 
only forge broad consensus, but even identify “correct” moral principles. His argument, 
which I will not belabor here, turns on the epistemic virtues of “many minds”; under 
conditions that correspond to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, “many minds” can be predicted 
to reach correct results—a prediction Sunstein thinks is as applicable to normative questions 
as it is to empirical facts about the world. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION 
OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 
94–121 (2009). 
 165.  See Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 12, at 21. 
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has been developed. That case, however, requires appreciating minimalism from a 
normative vantage point that Sunstein recognizes as the primary antagonist of 
republicanism: pluralism.166  
Below, I turn to unpack the pluralist case for minimalist decisions. The 
argument proceeds in several steps. After reviewing the basic commitments that 
define pluralism, Part II.B.1 explains why these commitments lead many pluralists 
to favor a contractarian approach to interpretation. Part II.B.2 then shows that, 
given certain plausible assumptions, contractarianism supports two complementary 
interpretative default rules: First, courts should interpret ambiguous statutes to 
reflect whatever preferences are enactable. Second, when no group is capable of 
enacting its preferences, courts should, instead, interpret ambiguous statutes in a 
way that compromises, or trims, between competing preferences. 
Part II.B.3 takes a short detour to explain why contractarian theory also supports 
applying these default rules dynamically, in a way that is sensitive to changes over 
time in interest groups’ power to enact their preferences.  
Together, these three Parts sketch a distinctively pluralist approach to statutory 
interpretation, one that favors adopting compromise, or trimming, interpretations 
when an interpretive question becomes very divisive—too divisive to be resolved 
legislatively. And with this approach firmly in view, Part II.B.4 concludes by 
showing why, under the right conditions, the approach supports a form of judicial 
minimalism.  
1. Pluralism  
Where republicans believe in the existence of a “common good,” pluralists are 
moral skeptics who think “any statement about the common good reduces to a 
statement about the speaker’s personal tastes and preferences.”167 And where 
republicans are optimists about the possibility of achieving social consensus, 
pluralists are pessimists. They think disagreement is inevitable. In the pluralist 
view, as Thomas Merrill says, “individuals and groups have divergent interests and 
values that are . . . exogenously determined, in the sense that they are not much 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166.  See Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 18, at 1554, 1544 (contrasting 
republicanism, which “reject[s] ethical relativism and skepticism,” and “posit[s] the 
existence of a common good,” with pluralism, which views the notion of a common good as 
“mystical or tyrannical” and is, accordingly, “indifferent among preferences”). 
 167.  Merrill, supra note 17, at 629. Merrill distinguishes between different kinds of 
pluralists; here, I am using the term “pluralist” to refer to the group that Merrill calls 
“pessimistic” or “skeptical” judicial pluralists. See id. at 626–29.  
  Some pluralists, moreover, are skeptical about “thick” conceptions of the common 
good, but believe in a discernable “thin” conception of the common good, defined as an ethic 
of equal respect or tolerance for diverse values. See, e.g., BERLIN, supra note 24, at 216–17 
(in the face of conflict between ambitious theories, the only humane ideal is pluralism, 
defined as the refusal to “deprive men, in the name of some remote, or incoherent, ideal, of 
much that they have found to be indispensible to their life”); Judith N. Shklar, The 
Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 
1989). For further discussion, see infra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.  
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influenced by participation in the political process.”168 For them, there is only a 
raw, never-ending struggle between contending interest groups.  
While republicans think democratic deliberation fosters consensus, in the 
pluralist view, democratic institutions are a vehicle for compromise, not consensus 
building. As Merrill says, pluralists think “modern democratic institutions . . . 
aggregate or sum these private interests and values” and the “aggregating or 
summing process will tend to produce a public policy based on compromise that 
does not necessarily reflect a coherent conception of the common good.”169  
But republicans and pluralists nonetheless have some affinities: like republicans, 
judicial pluralists are skeptical of claims that courts should select interpretations of 
statutes that conform to judges’ assessment of good policy. Their reasons, however, 
differ. Republicans are skeptical of activist judges, because they think judges are 
less likely to identify outcomes consistent with the common good than legislatures. 
Pluralists, by contrast, see courts as little different from legislators—they, too, have 
exogenously determined values, and judicial “policy” decisions, in turn, reduce to 
expressions of whatever preferences a judge happens to hold.170 Worse, judicial 
pluralists think judicial policy making is much more likely to reflect a narrow set of 
preferences than legislative policy making.171 Since the judicial pluralist thinks 
judges are even more likely than legislatures or executives to reach results that 
accord with a narrow range of preferences, “a [judicial] pluralist is unlikely to 
prefer judicial policymaking.”172  
Instead, their moral skepticism, pessimistic views about the inevitability of 
disagreement, and distaste for judicial activism lead pluralists to think judges 
should show equal respect to contending interest groups.173 A common pluralist 
theory of “equal respect” is, in turn, contractarian—that is, it posits that courts 
show equal respect to interest groups by interpreting statutes using default rules to 
which interest groups would, hypothetically, consent, in advance.174  
Contractarianism, in turn, can lead pluralists to embrace a role for judicial 
compromise in the face of controversial interpretive choices. The next Part turns to 
explain why.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 168.  Merrill, supra note 17, at 626. 
 169.  Id.  
 170.  See id. at 628, 646. 
 171.  See id. at 629. 
 172.  Id. (“Since the judicial pluralist sees little reason why the collective action problems 
in litigation are less significant than those in the legislative process, and little reason to 
believe that multi-member appellate courts are less susceptible to cycling and agenda 
manipulation than legislatures, such a pluralist is unlikely to prefer judicial policymaking to 
legislative and executive policymaking.” (citations omitted)). 
 173.  See ELHAUGE, supra note 18, at 25 (stating that “reasonable disagreements about 
what is just and desirable” necessitate a political (and judicial) system that shows “equal 
respect to all persons”); cf. Merrill, supra note 17, at 639–40 (making the related point that 
pluralists try to reach results that maximize “[t]he net sum of winners over losers”). 
 174.  See Merrill, supra note 17, at 642–43 (noting that pluralists think courts should act 
as “bargain-enforcing faithful agent[s]” for the interest groups that form the legislative 
polity); see also infra notes 175–82 and accompanying text (discussing the contractarian 
approach to selecting default interpretive rules advocated by a leading academic pluralist, 
Einer Elhauge). 
672 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:645 
 
2. Two Pluralist Models of Judicial Neutrality 
A common way to show equal respect to interest groups is to adopt interpretive 
default rules to which interest groups would, hypothetically, agree, in advance.175 
This contractarian approach, in turn, leads to two different, but complementary, 
default rules. First, courts should interpret ambiguous statutes176 to reflect 
preferences that are enactable through the political process. Second, in highly 
controversial cases where it’s very likely no interpretation is enactable, courts 
should switch to trimming, or moderating between, the preferences of competing 
interest groups. 
Einer Elhauge, a leading pluralist, is a powerful advocate for the first default 
rule. Judges, he argues, should interpret statutes in light of enactable preferences. In 
other words, where several interpretations of a statute are possible, courts should 
survey pre- and post-enactment legislative history and agency interpretations to 
determine which of the interpretations most likely could be enacted by both houses 
of Congress and signed by the President, and then select that interpretation.177  
This default rule can be justified from contractarian premises, as Elhauge 
acknowledges. Democratic political processes, he says, do a reasonable, if 
imperfect, job of “accurately and equally weigh[ing] our different conceptions” of 
the good,178 while judicial policy making reflects a particularly narrow set of 
preferences that “violate[s] individual conceptions of the good more often.”179 
Interpreting ambiguous statutes in a way that reflects enactable preferences, 
accordingly, is less likely to offend interest group preferences, on average, and is 
therefore the decision rule to which interest groups would all, plausibly, agree if 
they had a chance to bargain over the decision rules that courts apply.180 
At times, indeed, Elhauge goes farther. He suggests that interest group consent 
is not hypothetical, but real. Interest groups, after all, have created our legislative 
system and exhibit continuing willingness to submit to preferences that are strong 
                                                                                                                 
 
 175.  Contractarian theories of equal respect are particularly prevalent in literature on 
political justice. For an overview, see Scott Gordon, The New Contractarians, 84 J. POL. 
ECON. 573 (1976) (critically surveying Rawls, Nozick, and James Buchanan). 
 176.  I am using “ambiguous” here in a colloquial way, rather than the technical sense in 
which the term is used in modern language theory: that is, I use it to mean that the statute’s 
text is either susceptible to multiple interpretations (what language theorists call 
“ambiguity”) or enacts a principle that is susceptible of borderline cases in application (what 
language theorists call “vagueness”). For a discussion of technical distinction between 
ambiguity and vagueness, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 051: 
Vagueness and Ambiguity, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (Aug. 2, 2010), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2006/08/legal_theory_le.html. For further 
discussion of the limitation of my argument to textual ambiguity or vagueness, see infra note 
190 and accompanying text. 
 177.  ELHAUGE, supra note 18, at 23–38. 
 178.  Id. at 24. 
 179.  Id. at 25. 
 180.  See id. at 24 (suggesting his default rule rests on “consequentialist grounds: if 
everyone accepts this social compact, the expected good consequences outweigh the bad for 
each of us”); cf. id. at 25 (“An interpreter who insists her conception of the good must take 
precedence breaches the fundamental social contract.”). 
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enough to gain enactment through it. As a result, interpreting statutes in ways that 
are enactable satisfies conditions of legitimacy to which interest groups would not 
only hypothetically consent, but to which they, in fact, do consent on an ongoing 
basis.181 
Often, though, an ambiguous statute is ambiguous precisely because no 
interpretation of the statute is enactable. Unable to come to agreement, interest 
groups enact a vague statute, punting the question about its meaning to courts. 
Where ambiguity is the product of a legislative deadlock, Elhauge suggests courts 
should fall back on various supplemental default rules designed to reach 
approximations of some subset, or second-best set, of enactable preferences—either 
those of governmental subunits, localities, or “the old political processes” that 
nominated federal judges.182 My claim here, however, is that contractarian theory 
supports a different interpretive approach entirely: where ambiguity is the product 
of a legislative stalemate, courts should, instead, choose interpretations that trim 
between competing preferences.183  
Justifying this claim requires saying more about the reasons why interest groups 
would, plausibly, agree in advance to abide by results that are capable of 
enactment. Ours is a supermajority system. And the signal features of that 
system—supermajority voting rules like the filibuster, checks and balances, 
bicameralism, and federalism—make it difficult for any interest group to enact their 
preferences. 
The most plausible reason interest groups might insist on these roadblocks is 
because they are averse to uncertainty and therefore focus on controlling 
uncertainty about their fortunes in the future. Studies of people’s decisions under 
uncertainty suggest that a “general preference to act on more information rather 
than less, on known risks rather than under uncertainty, is widespread and 
dependable.”184 And in the constitutional moment when interest groups consider 
framework rules, groups face significant uncertainty. Even if they are dominant 
now, they don’t know whether they will be dominant in the future. And, in any 
event, they may be “less confident in their interests over a more extended time 
horizon” because their preference may change in light of unforeseen contingencies 
or as a result of “preference drift.”185  
                                                                                                                 
 
 181.  See id. at 29–31 (noting that interpreting statutes to reflect enactable preferences 
legitimates interpretation because it accords with the “accepted . . . set of reasons” that we, 
collectively, think “justify compelled obedience” to statutory commands—namely, that those 
commands reflect preferences that are able to surmount “legislative obstacles (like the 
concurrence of separate legislative houses and an executive)”). 
 182.  Id. at 227–40. 
 183.  This is not Elhauge’s view but, for reasons I suggest below, is offered as a friendly 
amendment, or addition, to Elhauge’s framework, flowing from shared pluralist and 
contractarian premises.  
 184.  S.L. HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS: PERSONALITY AND POLITY 374 (1989). 
 185.  Kenneth A. Shepsle, Old Questions and New Answers About Institutions: The Riker 
Objection Revisited, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1031, 1037 (Barry 
R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006) (stating that in a “constitutional moment,” in 
which decision makers structure institutions and framework rules for governing them, 
deliberators may structure rules with a focus on limiting the risk of future losses rather than 
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Maximin, in turn, “may emerge from the aversion of contractors to uncertainty, 
independently of their attitudes to risk,” because maximin guarantees a certain 
minimum payoff and limits uncertainty to the degree of “positive deviations from 
the certain minimum.”186 Interest groups acting consistently with maximin will, in 
turn, prefer framework rules that limit the risk of disastrous losses for all groups, in 
order to insure against uncertainty about what their position, and preferences, will 
be in the future. Supermajority rules like the filibuster, checks and balances, and 
various forms of federalism provide this protection. Together these rules force 
dominant groups to compromise with minority groups, ensuring minorities get 
some of what they want, or leave space for different groups to go their own way 
and enact their disfavored preferences somewhere. 
And it is plausible to think that interest groups that prefer these restraints would 
also sometimes prefer that, in the face of a legislative deadlock, courts interpret 
ambiguous statutes in a way that trims between competing interests. They may not 
prefer such a rule when it is clear which preferences are enactable in a 
supermajority system. In that case, so long as courts interpret statutes in a way that 
reflects preferences that are enactable, courts provide as much protection for 
minority preferences as the legislative system that interest groups design allows. 
But it is especially plausible to think that interest groups would prefer that courts 
trim between competing interests when it is very unlikely that any group can enact 
its preferences—or deeply uncertain that any can. In that case, groups exhibiting 
                                                                                                                 
maximizing current gains because, while “[d]eliberators often know their own endowments, 
and thus their own interests, and sometimes even those of relevant others[,] . . . they may be 
less confident in their interests over a more extended time horizon owing to preference drift, 
unforeseen contingencies, and even foreseen contingencies that arise stochastically but have 
not yet been realized”). 
 186.  HURLEY, supra note 184, at 377. Maximin is often explained (and criticized) as a 
decision rule appropriate only in cases where extreme risk aversion is warranted. However, it 
is not necessary to posit extraordinarily grave risks and a high degree of risk aversion in 
order to justify maximin. “[M]aximin may emerge from the aversion of contractors to 
uncertainty, independently of their attitudes to risk,” because choosers exhibiting aversion to 
uncertainty “will not simply treat ignorance of probabilities as a warrant for assigning equal 
probabilities to alternatives.” Id. at 376–77. Even so, the plausibility of maximin only 
increases where the choice not only involves uncertainty, but where the “stakes are 
important,” implicating both aversion to uncertainty and to the risk of losses. See Daniel 
Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643, 663 (1961) (noting 
that where the “stakes are important” and the probability of distributions resulting from the 
choice is uncertain, it is reasonable for actors to exhibit uncertainty aversion by preferring 
bets based on payoffs that are “relatively insensitive” to uncertainty (emphasis in original)).  
  For further discussion of the possibility rationality of maximin in the face of 
uncertainty, see JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE: A CASE STUDY IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 185–207 (1983); R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND 
DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 278–82 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1989) (1957); 
Kenneth J. Arrow & Leonid Hurwicz, An Optimality Criterion for Decision-Making Under 
Ignorance, in UNCERTAINTY AND EXPECTATIONS IN ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
G.L.S. SHACKLE 1 (C.F. Carter & J.L. Ford eds., 1972); C.Y. Cyrus Chu & Wen-Fang Liu, A 
Dynamic Characterization of Rawls’s Maximin Principle: Theory and Implications, 12 
CONST. POL. ECON. 255, 268 (2001) (modeling maximin as a response to uncertainty, rather 
than risk, aversion); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
841, 882 (2006). 
2011] PROCEDURE’S AMBIGUITY 675 
 
maximin preferences and aversion to uncertainty would hardly agree to allow 
courts to short circuit a legislative process designed for their mutual protection by 
siding with one set of preferences and imposing it across the board.187 They would 
prefer, instead, that courts adopt compromise interpretations that give each some of 
what it values.  
It bears emphasizing that the claim here rests on a hypothesis about what interest 
groups would agree to in a hypothetical constitutional moment. It does not rest on 
the content of any actual agreement. But it is a realistic hypothesis, based on 
assumptions that track “widespread and dependable” empirical findings that show 
that uncertainty aversion is a common feature of human decision making188 and that 
help explain the durability of the institutions we have. While more can be said to 
defend the claim advanced above,189 a contractarian case that rests on a realistic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 30 (1985) (noting that uncertainty would lead groups 
to reject random selection of one person as the “dictator” of the good for everyone). Indeed, 
in large stakes cases, where it is unclear which group is dominant, even interest groups that 
are dominant would prefer a decision that trims between group preferences, rather than 
taking a gamble on courts’ unpredictable attempts to assess which interpretations are 
enactable.  
 188.  HURLEY, supra note 184, at 374. 
 189.  A starting point would be with the work of James Buchanan and David Gauthier. 
James Buchanan, with Gordon Tullock and Geoffrey Brennan, made the seminal 
contractarian argument for supermajoritarianism, and other constitutional restraints, based on 
assumptions of interest group decisions made behind a “veil of uncertainty.” See JAMES M. 
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); see also BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 187, at 
30 (“Faced with genuine uncertainty about how his position will be affected by the operation 
of a particular rule, the individual is led by his self-interest calculus to concentrate on choice 
options that eliminate or minimize prospects for potentially disastrous results.”). Buchanan 
assumes that interest groups are risk neutral but are led by uncertainty and the circumstances 
of constitutional choice to behave “as if” they were risk averse; he calls them “quasi–risk 
avers[e].” Id. at 55. For an overview, see DAVID REISMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
JAMES BUCHANAN 123–35 (1990).   
  David Gauthier also “judges social structures permissible” if they would be chosen 
through a hypothetical “social agreement . . . based on rational negotiation among fully 
informed, determinate individuals.” Peter Vallentyne, Gauthier’s Three Projects, in 
CONTRACTARIANISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE: ESSAYS ON DAVID GAUTHIER’S MORALS BY 
AGREEMENT 1, 3–4 (Peter Vallentyne ed., 1991); see also DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY 
AGREEMENT (1986). According to Gauthier, rational agents would choose options according 
to the “minimax relative concession” principle—that is, they would choose options that 
“minimize[] the maximum relative concession that anyone makes.” Vallentyne, supra, at 8 
(emphasis omitted); see also GAUTHIER, supra, at 14–16. The approach sketched below, 
which assumes that interest groups would, in the face of ambiguity and a legislative 
deadlock, prefer interpretations that limit inequality in their respective dissatisfaction, see 
infra notes 206–08 and accompanying text, has obvious affinities to that principle. 
  Nonetheless, the approach sketched here departs from both Buchanan and Gauthier 
in various ways. For example, Gauthier does not assume any aversion to risk or uncertainty; 
his argument for the minimax relative concession principle is based instead on formal claims 
about the conditions for rational compliance with agreements. See GAUTHIER, supra, at 14–
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appraisal of human decision making and on assumptions that provide a plausible 
justification for existing institutions has much working in its favor.190 
Nonetheless, for those unconvinced by contractarian theories, there is another, 
less fictive way of understanding claims that courts should minimize inequality of 
dissatisfaction among interest groups. Used as a principle of public decision 
making, a contractarian theory in which contracting parties are assumed to decide 
according to maximin allows a decision maker to allocate opportunities for gains to 
one group only if others would agree to award those opportunities, given their 
(hypothesized) interest in ensuring a minimum security level for their own 
interests. In effect, this model requires the decision maker to treat risks of losses 
and opportunities for gains as things held in common, allowing each group an 
opportunity for gains at the price of sharing a roughly equal portion of the risk of 
loss from a decision with other parties.191  
As such, the hypothetical contract models a widely held intuition about political 
justice: public decisions must reflect “the value of mutual respect, which limits the 
grounds on which we may call on the collective power of the state to force those 
who do not share our convictions to submit” to our preferences.192 Pluralists who 
                                                                                                                 
16, 154–56. And, unlike Buchanan, I assume groups in a constitutional moment would 
choose conservatively, given uncertainty, not “quasi-risk,” aversion. Finally, unlike 
Buchanan, I take as a starting point the idea that contractarianism can properly inform 
judicial decision making. See James M. Buchanan, Contractarian Political Economy and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 135, 137 (1988) (arguing that courts must 
make “truth judgments” rather than “compromise[] among interests”). 
 190.  It also bears emphasizing that the argument here applies only in cases of statutory 
ambiguity. The argument assumes we are acting in the field of discretion left to courts by 
constitutional restraints. And where an enacting authority has promulgated a set of clear 
instructions, courts are constitutionally obligated to abide by those instructions. See, e.g., 
John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1680 (2001) (“[E]quitable interpretation may have fit well within 
English and state constitutional systems that blurred legislative and judicial powers, [but] it 
fits poorly within a Constitution that clearly demarcates those powers, while also prescribing 
a distinct and elaborate mechanism for enacting laws.”). Even aside from constitutional 
restraints, though, the conception of ex ante interest group agreement developed here 
independently favors limiting trimming interpretations to instances of true statutory 
ambiguity. A roving judicial power to displace the command of clear statutes would 
undermine the protections of the supermajority process that we are assuming maximin-
driven interest groups favor. It is only when a statute is silent or ambiguous—where no 
interpretation has actually made it through the supermajority process—that those groups 
might agree to a trimming approach to interpretation, since a judicial effort (however 
imperfect) to trim between preferences is on average much more likely to mimic the 
protections of a supermajority system, by limiting each group’s exposure to worst-case 
outcomes, than the imposition of whatever preferences happen to be favored by a small 
coterie of Supreme Court Justices.   
 191.  See John Rawls, Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 141, 
144–45 (1974) (noting that a contractual theory of fairness in which contractors are assumed 
to decide according to maximin models an aspiration of free and equal personality, in which 
a natural distribution of advantages is viewed as a “collective asset” that must be equally 
shared, subject to the difference principle).  
 192.  THOMAS NAGEL, Rawls and Liberalism, in CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE 87, 98 
(2002). 
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think courts should trim between interest group preferences are, in other words, not 
necessarily the moral skeptics they claim to be. Their claims are consistent with a 
thin theory of judicial morality, which posits an ethic of reciprocity among 
competing, equally matched interests embodied in a reluctance to impose uniquely 
tragic costs on deeply held viewpoints competing for judicial recognition. Under 
that ethic, where no set of interests is capable of enactment, courts cannot short 
circuit the legislative process by siding with one set of contending interests over 
another. They should, instead, act in a neutral fashion that guarantees each an 
opportunity to achieve some of what it values.193 
Not all pluralists will accept all of the preceding claims. But, given shared first 
principles—that courts should interpret statutes using default rules that interest 
groups might agree to—these are claims that many pluralists might accept. 
The upshot: many pluralists favor showing interest groups equal respect. And 
they think, in turn, that ethic requires courts to interpret ambiguous statutes using 
default rules to which interest groups consent. Given a certain set of plausible 
assumptions—that, in a constitutional moment, groups would exhibit maximin 
preferences given uncertainty about their future endowments and preferences—a 
strong contractarian case can be made, not only for interpreting statutes in a way 
that accords with preferences capable of enactment in our supermajority system, 
but for adopting interpretations that trim between competing interests when an 
interpretive question is so divisive that no interpretation can be enacted.194  
                                                                                                                 
 
 193.  See BERLIN, supra note 24, at 92 (asserting that in the face of reasonable pluralism, 
a just response is to create “more room for the attainment of . . . personal ends” for all 
concerned parties, if necessary through “logically untidy, flexible and even ambiguous 
compromise”).  
 194.  The foregoing argument, incidentally, may pose a false contrast between trimming 
interpretations and interpretations that reflect preferences that can be enacted. When no 
group is dominant, each group can achieve some of its preferences only by entering into a 
compromise deal with other groups. Agreement among equally powerful groups, in turn, is 
possible only when a compromise position gives each some of what it wants. As a result, 
trimming interpretations capture the essential feature of a deal groups might reach among 
themselves.   
  Below, I unpack the case for ambiguous interpretation as a form of trimming. 
Compromises between equally matched interest groups will often take the form of “logically 
untidy, flexible and . . . ambiguous” statutory language. BERLIN, supra note 24, at 92. And, 
as Joseph Grundfest and Adam Pritchard have shown, when interest groups are equally 
matched in the legislative process, they may actually prefer that courts interpret that 
language in an “ambiguous” way—that is, by interpreting the statute to enact a fuzzy 
standard that can be expected to yield inconsistent interpretations of the statute among lower 
courts. When courts do so, “[l]egislators with opposing views can then claim that they have 
prevailed in the legislative arena, and, as long as courts continue to issue conflicting 
interpretations, these competing claims of legislative victory remain credible.” Grundfest & 
Pritchard, supra note 16, at 628. Indeed, the prospect that courts will adopt varying 
interpretations of the statute may, as a result, be particularly essential to the legislative deal. 
Id. at 629 (“If the judiciary can predictably ascribe a consistent meaning to a record that 
legislators intend to be ambiguous, then ambiguity’s value as a tool of compromise is lost.”). 
  As a result, there is less of a gap between a rule that courts should trim and a focus 
on enactable preferences than appears at first glance. In any case where it is likely no group 
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Finally, these claims are also consistent with a widely held intuition: that courts, 
in the face of divisive debates, should show reciprocity to deeply held interests 
competing for judicial recognition. 
3. Pluralism and Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 
Pluralist approaches to statutory interpretation are dynamic, rather than static. 
Elhauge, for example, argues that courts should dynamically interpret ambiguous 
statutes to reflect today’s enactable preferences because all enacting interest group 
coalitions would uniformly “prefer a general default rule that tracks the enactable 
preferences of the current polity.”195 He explains: 
 Generally, an enacting polity’s preferences will be weaker regarding 
future events than . . . events during its time in governance. Part of the 
reason for this is the standard tendency of individuals to discount future 
events . . . . Most important, only some of those holding the enacting 
polity preferences will still be around when the future interpretation 
occurs. . . . Even without any change in the identity of officials or 
voters, their political views are likely to change over time, in part 
because their life situations will change . . . .196 
The upshot is that “the enacting polity would generally prefer influence over 
current interpretation of past statutes more than influence over future interpretation 
of its statutes.”197  
The same logic carries over to trimming interpretations. If, after all, the tradeoff 
between the enacting polity’s preferences and those of the current polity “looks 
decisively favorable to the current polity” with respect to enactable preferences,198 
the same tradeoff should favor the groups in the current polity when deciding 
whether to trim between competing interests.  
For example, imagine a statute enacted in 1938.199 It may be that the enacting 
polity had a clear preference for a particular interpretation of that statute. What if 
that interpretation is so controversial and divisive in the 2009 polity that it could 
not be enacted, and, in addition, no competing interpretation could be enacted 
either? What if, given changed circumstances, choice about how to apply the statute 
involves the risk of grave losses for many different interest groups with a stake in 
its application in 2009, risks each of these groups would prefer to limit or avoid?  
                                                                                                                 
is dominant enough to enact its preferred interpretation, and the stakes are important, an 
“ambiguous” interpretation is the only “interpretation” of the statute that is likely enactable. 
And it is the interpretation that the different groups that form the audience for the statute 
would want the judiciary to choose. Id. at 639 (“[I]f Congress decides that it must 
compromise and employ ambiguous, standards-based language in order to enact a piece of 
legislation, then the courts must agree to interpret the statute ambiguously in order for 
Congress to achieve its desired result.”). 
 195.  ELHAUGE, supra note 18, at 45. 
 196.  Id. at 44. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 45.  
 199.  This is the year, of course, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted.  
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Here, both the 1938 and the 2009 polity gain more from a rule that respects the 
interests of current groups over original enacting groups. It is easy to see that the 
2009 polity gains if courts adopt a current preferences default rule. Consider, 
though, the 1938 polity. A rule that insists on applying 1938 preferences in 2009 
means that 1938 interest groups capable of enacting their preferences reap tenuous 
gains from distant future applications of the statute. But that benefit comes at the 
expense of a serious risk of grave losses when the enacting preferences of pre-1938 
polities are applied in the face of debates that are deeply divisive in 1938. Both 
polities, then, gain much more when courts adopt general default rules that respect 
their preferences for limiting losses, by trimming in deeply divisive, large-stakes 
cases where there is no current majority preference.200  
4. Pluralism and Minimalism 
The argument so far: When a statute is ambiguous, it’s sometimes very clear, 
based on post-enactment legislative history or recent agency or executive 
interpretations, that only one of several competing interpretations is currently 
enactable.201 In that case, courts should dynamically interpret statutes in a way that 
minimizes the dissatisfaction of those with enactable preferences.  
Sometimes, though, it may be obvious that interest groups are so evenly 
matched, and an issue is so divisive, that no interpretation of the statute can be 
enacted. Or, alternatively, it may be obvious that an older interpretation has become 
so controversial that it cannot currently be enacted. In either case, courts should 
switch focus and dynamically interpret statutes in a way that “trims” between 
competing interests.  
The case for trimming, as we have seen, is contractarian. Sometimes, in turn, the 
contractarian model sketched above leads to the conclusion that courts should not 
only interpret statutes in a way that trims between interests, but should do so 
through ambiguous, or minimalist, interpretations. This section explains why. 
a. Trimming 
Trimming interpretations Solomonically split the difference between two sides. 
Trimmers, in turn, choose to trim for different reasons. As Cass Sunstein says, 
some “are unsure how to proceed . . . [and] choose to trim, with the thought that the 
truth probably lies in between [extremes].”202 Other trimmers, though, are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200.  This point is consistent with the Supreme Court’s current approach to stare decisis. 
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 921 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (noting that the stare decisis of prior precedent is diminished “when the 
precedent’s validity is so hotly contested that it cannot reliably function as a basis for 
decision in future cases”); see also Merrill, supra note 17, at 646 (pointing out that because 
stare decisis is a “judicial creation” that is “supported by values that inhere in the idea of the 
rule of law, such as predictability . . . and the protection of reliance interests,” pluralists, who 
are “skeptical about the objectivity of concepts of the public good,” place a relatively low 
value on stare decisis).  
 201.  ELHAUGE, supra note 18, at 72–111. 
 202.  Sunstein, Trimming, supra note 16, at 1065. 
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motivated not by doubt, but by an ethic of “civic respect” that demands 
“minimiz[ing] the harm to losers.”203 
Pluralists are variants of this second type of trimmer, but with a distinct 
emphasis: pluralist trimmers trim in a way that respects interest group preferences. 
Their trimming, as we have seen, flows from contractarian premises. It assumes 
interest groups, given uncertainty about their future preferences, would agree, in 
advance, only on institutional framework rules that satisfy maximin—in other 
words, that limit the risk of terrible losses for all groups. And when no 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute can secure enactment, interest groups with 
these preferences should prefer a default rule that directs courts to adopt 
compromise interpretations.  
A compromise capable of satisfying these groups’ maximin preferences would, 
in turn, do two things: it would limit gross inequalities in interest groups’ 
dissatisfaction,204 and it would also guarantee each group a minimum security level 
for its preferences. Pluralist trimmers, accordingly, try to find compromise 
interpretations that do both. 
Sunstein characterizes “trimming” and minimalist interpretations as distinct 
approaches to interpretation. While trimmers and minimalists, he says, are 
“jurisprudential cousins[,] . . . [m]inimalists celebrate the virtues of not deciding; 
trimmers want to decide.”205 In reality, though, the difference between the two is 
not so stark. Minimalist interpretations can also trim. By leaving much about the 
meaning of a statute undecided, a minimalist appellate interpretation can create 
space for lower courts to adopt a blend of different interpretations, yielding an 
average statutory result that trims between competing interest group preferences. 
Below, I show this sort of trimming minimalism is consistent with the 
contractarian model described above under two conditions: First, there is no 
determinate interpretation that can reliably split the difference between interest 
group preferences. Second, the costs of legal uncertainty pale in comparison to the 
worst case costs of a clear rule for various interest groups. I will take both points in 
order. 
b. Trimming Minimalism 
First, sometimes—although not always—a minimalist decision is the only way 
to trim between contending interests. Consider the following scenarios. 
 
Two Group Zero-Sum Competitions. Consider a statute that has two 
interpretations: restrained and broad. Imagine there are only two interest groups, 
one whose preferences would be maximized by the narrow interpretation and one 
whose preferences would be maximized by the broad interpretation.  
Here a court has two potential trimming strategies. First, it might adopt a 
minimalist decision, yielding a mix of lower court interpretations, some restrained, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 203.  See id. at 1080. 
 204.  This claim is also consistent with David Gauthier’s minimax relative concession 
principle. See GAUTHIER, supra note 189, at 14–16. 
 205. Sunstein, Trimming, supra note 16, at 1080. 
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some broad. Under a mix of interpretations, the losing group loses less than if one 
interpretation were chosen across the board. Second, it might pick a determinate 
intermediate interpretation that splits the difference between the interests of the two 
groups.  
If a determinate, difference-splitting interpretation is available, courts should 
choose it. However, in cases where a statutory standard will be applied by many 
subsequent interpreters against a background of complex facts and changing 
conditions, it may be impossible—or at least exceedingly difficult—for judges with 
limited time and bounded cognitive capacities to identify a precise, well-delineated 
interpretation that balances the interests of either side. In that case, it will be easier, 
instead, to adopt a fuzzy standard that triggers a variety of approaches to the 
problem in lower courts. Doing so may not split the difference between the 
expectations of either group as perfectly as a precise intermediate rule, but may 
come as close as practicable to doing so. 
 
Multi-Group Conflicts with Severe Uncertainty. Consider another variation. This 
time, assume that there are three interest groups, and three interpretations of a 
statute: restrained, moderate, and broad. Assume, further, that two of the interest 
groups—A and B—face severe uncertainty about which interpretation will result in 
the best outcomes. Moreover, each interpretation poses a plausible risk of a 
disastrous outcome from the standpoint of their preferences, which we will assign a 
value of 20. Assume, as well, that when one of the interpretations results in a 
disastrous outcome, the other, alternative interpretations will not.  
The third interest group C, by contrast, assesses the interpretations under 
conditions of knowledge, rather than uncertainty. C knows that the restrained 
interpretation is best, the moderate interpretation will result in 10 increments of 
dissatisfaction, and the broad interpretation, 20 increments of dissatisfaction. 
We have assumed that interest groups exhibit maximin preferences in the face of 
uncertainty. If so, A and B would prefer a fuzzy interpretation that results in a mix 
of lower court interpretations.206 When a decision maker is faced with choices 
involving unknown risks, a sensible maximin strategy is to mix bets. So long as the 
bets are offsetting, a mix of bets hedges against the hard-to-quantify risk of loss 
threatened by any one bet.207  
                                                                                                                 
 
 206.  Ascribing maximin preferences to these groups reflects an assumption, supported 
by a steady stream of empirical evidence, that people are reliably averse to uncertainty and 
therefore do “not simply treat ignorance of probabilities as a warrant for assigning equal 
probabilities to alternatives.” HURLEY, supra note 184, at 376.  
 207.  See, e.g., LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 186, at 73 (“[I]t may be sensible to use a 
mixed strategy as a hedge against extremely unfavorable situations . . . .”); see also Itzhak 
Gilboa & David Schmeidler, Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior, 18 J. 
MATHEMATICAL ECON. 141 (1989) (developing a related model of choice under uncertainty 
based on maximin expected utility); David Schmeidler, Subjective Probability and Expected 
Utility Without Additivity, 57 ECONOMETRICA 571 passim (1989) (constructing a model in 
which, in the face of uncertainty aversion, an individual who is acting consistently with a 
model of Choquet expected utility, a special case of maximin expected utility, and who is 
indifferent between bets with uncertain payoffs, prefers an equal mixture of ambiguous bets 
in order to smooth expected utility); Uzi Segal, The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An 
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For example, imagine an urn with 100 balls, composed of an unknown mixture 
of red or black balls. If given a choice between placing a bet that pays $100 if a red 
ball is pulled from an urn, or placing a bet that pays $100 if a black ball is pulled 
from the urn, a decision maker acting consistently with maximin would value each 
choice the same: each risks the same worst-case scenario, receiving nothing. That 
same bettor, however, would prefer placing two bets—a bet that pays $50 if red is 
pulled and a bet that pays $50 if black is pulled—since if she makes two bets, she is 
guaranteed $50. 
With the value of hedging in mind, consider, now, our hypothetical choice 
between three interpretations: restrained, moderate, and broad.  
 
       Restrained____________ Moderate_______________ Broad 
  
A    0/10/20                 0/10/20     0/10/20 
 
B    0/10/20   0/10/20     0/10/20 
 
C     0     10     20 
 
Assume A and B know that one interpretation will result in 0 increments of 
dissatisfaction, another 10 increments, and the third 20 increments. A and B, facing 
uncertainty about whether any interpretation will result in the worst-case scenario, 
would, acting consistently with maximin preferences, value any single 
interpretation, applied across the board, equivalently with its worst case outcome: 
20.208 But they will value an ambiguous interpretation that results in a roughly 
equal mix of different lower court interpretations consistent with an expected 
worst-case outcome of 1/3(20) + 1/3(10) + 1/3(0), or 10. If, by contrast, we could 
predict that 70% of lower courts would select the broad interpretation, and 30% 
would split between restrained and moderate ones, A and B would face an expected 
worst-case dissatisfaction of .7(20) + .15(10), or 15.5. Either way, A and B would 
prefer courts to adopt an ambiguous minimalist interpretation that results in a mix 
of lower court approaches. 
                                                                                                                 
Anticipated Utility Approach (UCLA Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 362, 1986), 
available at http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp362.pdf (modeling uncertainty 
aversion based on an anticipated utility model); id. at 28–29 (“As ambiguous lotteries appear 
to be riskier than clear lotteries, it is natural to expect that a decision maker with a higher 
degree of risk aversion is willing to pay less to participate in a certain ambiguous lottery.”). 
  For discussion of ambiguous statutory standards as a “mixed strategy,” see 
Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 16, at 639–40 (“Statutes that are rules-based, precise, and 
unambiguous are expressed as pure strategies in the interactive-interpretive equilibrium 
between legislatures and courts. . . . Statutes that are standards-based and adopted as a 
consequence of a compromise rooted in ambiguity are expressed as mixed equilibria. Once 
enacted, these statutes should give rise to a range of potentially inconsistent interpretations 
that reflect the ambiguity intended by the legislative bargain.”). 
 208.  LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 186, at 278 (noting that decision makers exhibiting 
maximin preferences value an act according to the “worst state for that act, and the ‘optimal 
choice’ is the one with the best worst state”). 
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Under a moderate interpretation, C does worse than its preferred (restrained) 
interpretation but better than its worst-case (broad) interpretation. But it also does 
better than its worst-case interpretation under a minimalist standard. C would value 
an ambiguous interpretation that results in a roughly equal mix of different lower 
court interpretations consistent with an expected worst-case outcome of 1/3(20) + 
1/3(10) + 1/3(0), or 10—the same as a moderate interpretation. If, by contrast, we 
could predict that 70% of lower courts would select the broad interpretation, and 
30% would split between restrained and moderate ones, C would face an expected 
worst-case dissatisfaction of .7(20) + .15(10), or 15.5—worse than a moderate 
interpretation but still better than a broad one. 
Trimming, in turn, requires selecting an interpretation that limits the harm to 
losers while giving each group some of what they value. And, here, picking any 
interpretation across the board is no way to trim: it imposes an unacceptably 
uncertain risk of bad outcomes for A and B, which they value the same as the 
absolute worst available outcome.  
A minimalist interpretation, here, is the only way to trim. Only a minimalist 
standard, and the resulting mix of lower court interpretations, can limit the risk of 
terrible outcomes for A and B. And while a moderate interpretation gives C some 
of what it wants, so does a mix of lower court interpretations. Sometimes, indeed, 
that mix may improve on the moderate interpretation; sometimes it may do worse. 
But, regardless, a mix ensures C some minimum security level for its preferences, 
too. 
Under a minimalist interpretation, then, no group guarantees everything they 
want by forcing the others to assume risks they view as intolerable. Instead, a 
minimalist interpretation achieves just what pluralist trimming demands: It limits 
inequality in dissatisfaction for each group, while ensuring each group a minimum 
security level for its preferences. It models the essential feature of any fair deal 
among equals. 
 
Three Group Conflicts Without Uncertainty. Minimalism is not always the best 
trimming strategy. In a case involving just two groups, a determinate intermediate 
interpretation (when one is available) is an effective trimming strategy. Each gets 
some of what it wants—and equal shares, at that. And in general, concerns for 
planning and uncertainty should lead courts to pick determinate interpretations, so 
long as they do at least as good a job of minimizing inequality of dissatisfaction as 
a minimalist interpretation.  
This will be true in a number of cases in which there is a determinate 
intermediate interpretation. Consider a final scenario, where group A prefers a 
restrained interpretation, group B prefers the moderate interpretation, and group C 
prefers the broad interpretation. Each interpretation is separated by 10 units of 
dissatisfaction.209  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 209.  This example is a variation of a scenario provided by Einer Elhauge, which he uses 
to demonstrate why picking moderate interpretations may minimize enactable preference 
dissatisfaction in cases where each interpretation has a positive chance of being enacted, but 
less than even odds of enactment. See ELHAUGE, supra note 18, at 136. 




     A              10           B             10           C 
 
If the moderate interpretation is chosen, A and C will face dissatisfaction of 10, 
and B will face dissatisfaction of 0. By contrast, if a fuzzy interpretation is chosen 
that results in a roughly equal mix of the three decisions, A and C will face 
dissatisfaction of 1/3(0) + 1/3(10) + 1/3(20), or 10. B will face expected 
dissatisfaction of 1/3(0) + 1/3(10) + 1/3(10), or 7. As a result, no group is worse 
off, and B is better off, if courts pick the moderate interpretation.  
Indeed, the point holds in all kinds of cases in which there are many 
interpretations and many contending groups, each of which is secure in its 
preferences. In these cases, picking an intermediate interpretation over extremes 
will always do just as good a job at trimming as a minimalist standard. All things 
equal, in such cases, intermediate interpretations are to be preferred. 
The bottom line then: Minimalism is not always a sensible trimming strategy. It 
only is in some cases, specifically, those where a fuzzy standard that triggers a mix 
of lower court interpretations is the only way to limit inequality in dissatisfaction 
and there is no alternative determinate interpretation that does an equally 
competent job at trimming. Those instances include: (1) cases where an 
interpretation poses a zero-sum tradeoff between two competing interest groups, 
and courts cannot easily identify an intermediate rule that splits the difference 
between their interests; and (2) cases where an interpretive choice poses an 
uncertain risk of grave losses for interest groups no matter how the choice is 
resolved.  
c. Planning and the Limits of Minimalism 
Is there anything to be said against fuzzy, minimalist judgments? “A great deal, 
in law as in ordinary life,” argues Sunstein.210 “[A]n especially important problem 
comes from the need for planning. . . . With respect to many things, it is more 
important for people to know what the law is than for the law to have any particular 
content.”211 
Our focus has been on what default, interpretive approach interest groups, given 
their uncertainty about their future preferences, would prefer ex ante, that is, behind 
a veil about what their preferences will be in the future. And in some cases, 
concerns about uncertainty will sometimes lead interest groups to categorically 
reject minimalism in advance. When planning is much more important than the 
content of the law, minimalist decisions will increase, not decrease, the 
dissatisfaction of all groups with a stake in the interpretation. For that reason, 
interest groups will not prefer minimalism when courts decide the content of 
substantive rights in a wide swath of everyday tort, contract, or regulatory law, 
where the need for advance planning is at a premium. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210.  SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 13, at 54. 
 211.  Id. at 55. 
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In some cases, though, the costs of legal uncertainty entailed by a minimalist 
decision pale in comparison to the “worst case” costs of adopting a clear rule. In 
those cases, if they exhibit maximin preferences, interest groups will, ex ante, 
prefer minimalist decisions—although only in contexts where that is the only viable 
trimming strategy.  
Consider the scenarios just discussed. In zero-sum competitions, where the costs 
of judicial adoption of their opponent’s preferred interpretation greatly outstrip the 
costs of legal uncertainty, and there is no determinate difference-splitting 
interpretation, interest groups exhibiting maximin preferences will prefer an 
uncertain rule that results in a mix of lower court interpretations to an ad hoc 
judicial choice among competing interpretations of the statute across the board.  
Similarly, in cases where an interpretive choice imposes the risk of grave and 
uncertain losses for several groups if a single rule is chosen, groups acting 
consistently with maximin will prefer an uncertain rule that results in a mix of 
lower court approaches, hedging against the risk of terrible outcomes. They will 
disfavor a clear rule, which threatens them with the uncertain prospect of losing 
everything that matters to them.  
This is true even if some groups might, in particular cases, turn out to have a 
clear preference for one interpretation—like C in the example of this sort of 
problem from the last section. Remember, our focus is on what approach groups 
would prefer ex ante. While, at the point of judicial decision, C will not do as well 
under a minimalist standard as it would if its preferred (restrained) interpretation is 
chosen, when default rules are chosen ex ante, C does not know its own future 
preferences. Assuming C adopts an appropriately conservative maximin response 
to that uncertainty, C will prefer that courts adopt a default interpretive approach 
that limits the risks of worst-case outcomes for all groups with a stake in 
interpretive choices. And, in this particular kind of case, a minimalist standard is 
the only way to do so. Assuming that the cost of an unclear legal rule pales in 
comparison to worst-case outcomes avoided by a minimalist standard, C, like other 
groups, will therefore prefer that courts default to minimalism. 
Planning and certainty, then, are important limiting concerns for the use of 
minimalism as a trimming strategy. But when interest groups exhibit maximin 
preferences, and the worst outcome of a clear rule far outstrips the costs of an 
unclear rule, no interest groups have a vested interest in legal certainty. In that case, 
pluralists are willing to “pay uncertainty’s price”212 to the same degree as interest 
groups they commit to respect.213 
5. The Pluralist Case for Minimalism: A Summary  
We are in a position to sum up: Many pluralists think courts must interpret 
ambiguous statutes to conform with enactable preferences so long as there is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212.  Cf. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES, supra note 142, at 29. 
 213.  See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 17, at 646 (noting that, for pluralists, concerns about 
certainty and planning reflect yet another set of contestable preferences, and pluralists, given 
their skepticism about the “objectivity” of preferences, give them only as much weight as 
interest groups themselves do). 
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significant chance that one of several competing interpretations is enactable.214 But 
the focus should shift to trimming between competing interests when an 
interpretive choice is so controversial that no interpretation is enactable.215  
Opaque, minimalist decisions that “leave things undecided” appeal to pluralists 
as a trimming strategy under the following conditions: The worst-case scenario of a 
clear interpretation for various groups is much worse than the costs of uncertainty 
created by an unclear rule, and the interpretive choice involves either (1) a zero-
sum trade-off between the interests of two groups, where there is no determinate 
“difference splitting” interpretation of a statute; or (2) uncertain risks of serious 
harm for many different groups no matter how the interpretive question is 
resolved.216  
In those cases, minimalism has broad, flexible appeal as a trimming strategy—
indeed, in those cases, minimalist interpretations are the only way to trim. 
Assuming they exhibit maximin preferences, all groups would agree, in advance, 
that courts should adopt such interpretations in these contexts. 
The class of cases in which fuzzy, minimalist decisions make sense for pluralists 
is not terribly large. It excludes a broad swath of garden-variety substantive law, 
where the need for planning is far more important to all competing groups than any 
other consideration. It excludes contexts where a current majority is clearly able to 
enact a particular interpretation of a statute. Even outside those contexts, the 
circumstances where pluralist uses of minimalism are sensible are relatively 
narrow: Many interpretive problems, for example, do not implicate zero-sum 
conflicts between just two interest groups. And in contexts that do, there is often a 
determinate interpretation that splits the difference between those groups, obviating 
the need for a minimalist interpretation. Similarly, relatively few interpretive 
settings involve such severe uncertainty about the outcome of the choice that many 
groups would face an uncertain prospect of severe harm if any interpretation were 
adopted.  
Even so, there are some interpretive problems that fall within the core. As the 
next Part explains, interpretation of summary judgment and pleading standards are, 
at least plausibly, such problems.  
III. PROCEDURE’S MINIMALISM  
We are now in a position to return to the Celotex trilogy, Twombly, and Iqbal 
and analyze the cases through a pluralist lens. Below, Part III.A begins by 
recounting the domination of modern procedural rule making by interest-group 
conflict. Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2, in turn, unpack the case for opaque, minimalist 
interpretations of summary judgment and pleading standards, in light of that 
conflict. Part III.C considers some final objections. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 214.  See supra notes 175–82 and accompanying text. 
 215.  See supra notes 182–90 and accompanying text. 
 216.  See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. 
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A. Procedural Interest Groups 
Some readers may resist the notion that procedure implicates interest group 
conflict in the same way that substantive statutes do. While federal rules are 
approved by the Supreme Court, rule making within the judicial branch is, for all 
intents and purposes, controlled by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, composed 
of representatives of the practicing bar, the judiciary, and the academy.217 And, in 
the early decades after the creation of the federal rule-making system, the 
Committee’s work was undertaken without significant public interest or input.218 In 
theory, its output reflected the dispassionate technocratic expertise of the organized 
bar, free from the paralyzing interest group conflict that characterizes legislative 
and administrative decision making.219 
However, that’s no longer true, if it ever was. Growing skepticism about the 
ideological neutrality of the rule-making process led, in the 1970s and 1980s, to 
legislative changes in the federal rule-making process—including the creation of 
public notice and comment procedures, public hearings on proposed rule changes, 
and open advisory committee meetings.220 These changes opened the door to 
“intense” interest group pressure on rule makers.221  
“In contrast to . . . nineteenth and early twentieth century [rule makers and 
reformers],” modern interest groups with a stake in procedural design “sharply 
disagree about what, if anything, is wrong with the system and what should be done 
about it.”222 The result is a rule-making process characterized by pervasive interest 
group conflict.223 
                                                                                                                 
 
 217. See, e.g., Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1655, 1664–71 (1995) (reviewing changes to the rule-making process accomplished 
by Congress in 1988). 
 218.  See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, 
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 899 (1999) [hereinafter 
Bone, Process of Making Process]. 
 219.  Id. (describing the early rule-making process as premised on a technocratic view of 
rule making, based on the “reasoned deliberation by legal experts familiar with litigation 
practice,” free from “interest [group] accommodation”). 
 220.  Id. at 901–04 (describing changes in the 1970s and 1980s in the rule-making 
process, stemming from a progressive loss in “confidence in the efficacy and legitimacy of 
the traditional court rulemaking model”). 
 221.  Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound 
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 84 (1997) 
(characterizing the politics of modern rule making as “intense,” given the “enormous” stakes 
“for competing interest groups”); see also Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 218, 
at 903 (“Since 1973, various interest groups—plaintiffs’ bar, defendants’ bar, civil rights 
groups, and corporate groups—have become more active (some would say aggressive) at all 
stages of rulemaking . . . .”); id. at 924 (discussing rule makers’ incentives to make 
“concessions to powerful interest groups”). 
 222.  Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 
OKLA. L. REV. 319, 326 (2008) [hereinafter Bone, Making Effective Rules]. 
 223.  Id. at 327 (rule making characterized by “sharply conflicting interests and no 
generally accepted normative standard to resolve the conflict”); Bone, Procedural 
Discretion, supra note 26, at 1974 (“[I]n recent years, rulemakers themselves are divided or 
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Some of that conflict—between the trial bar and corporate defendants—is 
endemic to procedural rule making. What’s distinctive about modern interest group 
conflict in the rule-making process is the degree to which it also involves clashes 
between normative views of procedural justice. “Sensing the demise of judicial 
activism, social reformists have shifted strategy to the rulemaking process.”224 As a 
result, debates over procedural design increasingly intersect with intense debates 
about policy decisions with deep substantive implications, including questions 
about the just “distributional consequences of procedural rules . . . and the 
importance of litigation as a tool to empower disenfranchised groups.”225 Conflict 
over these issues, more than any others, is the source of modern rule making’s 
highly contentious character.226 
Others may argue that the case for minimalist interpretations doesn’t apply to 
procedural interpretation. The contractarian case for minimalism, as we have seen, 
rests on the idea that interest groups would, ex ante, select default rules consistent 
with maximin, given uncertainty about their future endowments and preferences. 
Ascribing this conservative decision-making strategy to interest groups is plausible, 
given their continuing acceptance of supermajority rules and other severe restraints 
on federal law making: adopting those restraints, after all, is also consistent with 
maximin.  
Yet, Congress has delegated rule making to the judicial branch.227 As a result, 
procedural rule making has been exempted from Congress’s cumbersome 
supermajority process. Congress can veto rules, but it does not play its usual role in 
enacting them.228 Because a rule takes effect if Congress doesn’t act, it can’t be 
bottled up in the House or Senate Judiciary Committees or filibustered in the 
Senate. Is it really, then, plausible to assume procedural interest groups share a 
conservative, maximin-oriented approach to rule making? 
Yes. In practice, the rule-making system is characterized by as much, if not 
more, inertia than the legislative process. Over the last thirty years, rule makers 
have produced few changes of major import.229 And that’s by design: Through 
more aggressive exercise of its veto power, and changes in rule-making procedures 
designed to increase legislative oversight and open the door to interest group 
pressure, Congress, spurred on by interest groups in the 1980s, worked a sea 
change in the rule-making process, turning it into a system that “more closely 
resembles a legislative process with broad public participation and interest group 
compromise than the process of principled deliberation it was originally conceived 
to be.”230 In the face of intense interest group pressure and fearful of a complete 
                                                                                                                 
face strongly conflicting interest group pressures.”). 
 224.  Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the 
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 801 (1991). 
 225.  Bone, Making Effective Rules, supra note 222, at 325. 
 226.  Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 218, at 915–17. 
 227.  28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2006). 
 228.  28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006). 
 229.  See Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and 
the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1612 (2008) 
(“The politicization of rulemaking has made it very difficult to revise the FRCP . . . because 
conflicting interest group pressures tend to create Advisory Committee stalemate.”). 
 230.  Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 218, at 954. 
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congressional override of the rule-making process, rule makers have, in turn, 
adopted an ethos of “accommodation of competing interest groups” characterized 
by an insistence on interest group consensus.231 The result is a stalemate: the output 
of the modern rule-making process consists of “highly general rules that leave most 
of the difficult normative questions to the discretion of” later decision makers—
namely, “trial judges in individual cases.”232  
In effect, the rule-making process—with its emphasis on interest group 
accommodation and consensus—shares the signal feature of a supermajority 
legislative system: it’s difficult to get things done without unusually wide 
agreement. Interest groups were instrumental in creating the modern rule-making 
system. A plausible explanation for their continuing acceptance of this institutional 
state of affairs—and the rule-making stasis that it produces—is that they, too, are 
averse to uncertainty about their future fortunes in a more dynamic system and 
instead prefer, consistent with maximin, institutional arrangements that, in the 
absence of wide consensus, guarantee each group some of what it wants. Here, as 
in the statutory arena, the same preferences would lead interest groups, ex ante, to 
prefer compromise interpretations that trim between competing interests in the face 
of divisive debates where there is no consensus position.233 
The upshot: Judges interpreting ambiguous procedures must resolve procedural 
ambiguity against a backdrop of intense interest group conflict. The nature of 
conflict in that system presents, in turn, a hospitable climate for pluralist use of 
minimalism: it involves divisive conflicts over the interpretation of ambiguous 
procedural rules between interest groups unable to impose their preferences through 
a rule-making process built on an ethos of consensus and compromise. 
B. Trimming Between Procedural Interest Group Preferences 
Of course, the pluralist case for minimalism as a trimming strategy is at its 
height in two contexts: zero-sum competitions between two groups and cases in 
which an interpretive choice imposes an uncertain risk of important losses for 
several groups. In the procedural contexts addressed by the Celotex trilogy, 
Twombly, and Iqbal, interest group conflict takes both forms. Trial lawyers and 
corporate defendants are locked in a zero-sum competition for procedural gain, 
while a choice among formulations of summary judgment and pleading rules 
involves important, uncertain risks for adherents of different accounts of procedural 
justice.  
Below, I unpack the pluralist virtues of ambiguous, minimalist formulations of 
summary judgment and pleading standards given conflict between both types of 
interest groups.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 231.  Id. at 902; see also Bone, Making Effective Rules, supra note 222, at 327 (“Faced 
with sharply conflicting interests . . . the Advisory Committee often seeks consensus among 
competing interest groups.”). 
 232.  Bone, Making Effective Rules, supra note 222, at 327. 
 233.  See supra notes 183–90 and accompanying text. 
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1. Trial Lawyers and Corporate Defendants 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers and a class of large, repeat-player corporations perceive 
themselves to be locked in what amounts to a zero-sum competition for procedural 
advantage.234 And studies of repeat-player litigants in the federal system seem to 
suggest their perceptions are well founded. Based on a survey of federal civil 
filings between 1970 and 2000, Gillian Hadfield found that in 2000, “organizations 
[we]re defendants in more than 80% of all federal civil litigation [excepting 
prisoner litigation, forfeiture, overpayment recovery, and student loan cases]”—a 
20% increase since 1970.235 Terence Dunworth and Joel Rogers make similar 
findings for large corporate defendants (what they term the class of “Fortune 2000” 
firms)236 over the twenty year period starting in 1971. During that period, Fortune 
2000 firms appeared as defendants in 74% of cases.237  
Dunworth and Rogers’s study is the only comprehensive study, to date, of multi-
decade trends in corporate party status in specific substantive categories of cases. 
While they do not provide information on the frequency of corporate party status in 
all substantive categories of cases,238 they do provide a snapshot of patterns of party 
                                                                                                                 
 
 234.  See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Discovery, Burdens, Risks, and Iqbal, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (June 2, 2009), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/06 
/discovery-defaults-and-iqbal.html (“Seventy years ago, parties were largely 
interchangeable. A person or business entity was as likely to be a defendant as a plaintiff. So 
big business saw less of a need to push a defense-favorable view of the procedural rules, 
because a business might find itself as a plaintiff enjoying the benefits of notice pleading. 
There is far less interchangeability today—corporations and government are almost always 
defendants (and repeat defendants at that) who know they will almost exclusively enjoy 
benefits from a defense-favorable pleading regime.”). 
 235.  Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil 
Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition 
of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1298 (2005). After adjusting her data to 
offset the undercounting of suits in which organizational parties are not identified as the first 
named party, Hadfield estimates that 90% of all [non-prisoner, non–student loan] suits 
involve an organization as at least one party-defendant, while the percentage of suits 
involving individuals, but not organizations, as plaintiffs, remains stable at about 70% of all 
nonprisoner, non–student loan civil litigation. Id. at 1301.   
 236.  Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation 
in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971–1991, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 497, 518 (1996) (defining the 
“Fortune 2000” as the 2000 firms listed by Fortune as belonging to either the 500 largest 
industrial or 500 largest service firms between 1971 and 1987). 
 237.  Id. at 540. Dunworth and Rogers found that Fortune 2000 party status in federal 
litigation remained constant between 1971 and 1991 in tort and contract cases, but the 
incidence in which these firms appeared as defendants in civil rights and labor cases 
increased from 72% to 93% over the same period. Id. at 542.   
 238.  Dunworth and Rogers lump all non-tort (with “tort” narrowly defined to encompass 
personal injury and product liability suits) and non-contract cases into a catch-all category of 
“other causes of action,” and, in this category, only break out figures for “civil rights/labor” 
litigation. Id. at 541. The remaining category of non–civil rights statutory actions 
encompasses a vast swath of litigation—everything from constitutional challenges to 
statutes; to Administrative Procedure Act challenges to federal rule making; to FOIA 
requests, federal tax litigation, social security benefit disputes, Interstate Commerce 
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appearance in some: product liability, personal injury, and civil rights (mostly 
employment discrimination and labor). 
In these categories, which comprised half of the litigation in which Fortune 2000 
firms appeared between 1971 and 1991,239 Fortune 2000 firms appeared as 
defendants in 94.4% of personal injury and product liability actions and 90.3% of 
all civil rights and labor actions in which they appeared.240 The only category of 
litigation in which Dunworth and Rogers found a rough parity between Fortune 
2000 firms’ appearance as plaintiffs and defendants were commercial contractual 
disputes, which comprised 30% of the litigation in which Fortune 2000 defendants 
were involved between 1971 and 1991.241 In these suits, Fortune 2000 entities were 
more likely to appear as plaintiffs in non-insurance-related contract disputes.242 
Since Dunworth and Rogers published their findings, civil rights cases, excluding 
labor suits, have experienced the biggest percentage growth in any category of 
litigation, while contract suits have experienced a declining share (by about one-
third) of federal litigation.243 In the remaining category of suits—actions involving 
                                                                                                                 
Commission rate challenges, and a vast number of other statutory litigation in which nuances 
in pleading and summary judgment are relatively unimportant; to securities litigation, 
environmental litigation, consumer fraud suits, civil RICO, and intellectual property and 
trademark litigation, where nuanced differences in those standards are important. See, e.g., 
id. at 565–67 (describing case-coding). As a result, this category provides relatively little 
information about corporate party-alignment in those contexts, outside tort (narrowly 
defined), contract, and civil rights, where battles over pleading and summary judgment are 
likely to matter. 
 239.  Id. at 541 (torts, including product liability and personal injury, accounted for 38% 
of litigation in which Fortune 2000 firms appeared, while “civil rights/labor” actions 
accounted for 12.4% of litigation in which Fortune 2000 firms appeared, between 1971 and 
1991). 
 240.  Id.  
 241.  See id.; see also Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May 
or May Not Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577, 586 (“There 
was a swelling total of contract cases until 1990; in the early 1990s several years of 
substantial declines reduced the volume of contract cases by about one third; this was 
followed by a period of little change from year to year.”). Dunworth and Rogers find that 
filing trends for cases in which Fortune 2000 firms were involved track general filing trends. 
Dunworth & Rogers, supra note 236, at 547–48. However, they also found that the “swelling 
total of contract cases” in the 1980s, noted by Galanter, was not mirrored in activity among 
F2000 firms, which were involved in significantly less non-insurance contract litigation than 
the general population of litigants during that decade. Dunworth & Rogers, supra note 236, 
at 548. Dunworth and Rogers also note there was also an anomalous “hump” in F2000 non-
insurance contract litigation over a few years in the early 1970s that was not reflected in the 
general population’s contract litigation. Id. 
 242.  See Dunworth & Rogers, supra note 236, at 541 (noting that F2000 parties 
appeared as defendants in 50.2% of contract cases and as plaintiffs in 49.8% of contract 
cases; F2000 firms, largely insurers, appeared as defendants in 67.1% of insurance contract 
disputes, while F2000 firms appeared as defendants in 42.5% of non-insurance contract 
disputes). 
 243.  See Hadfield, supra note 235, at 1289–90 (“Where growth has been the greatest in 
percentage terms has been in terms of new rights created by Congress. Civil rights cases—
which include employment, accommodation, welfare, and other cases—have, of course, 
increased dramatically since 1970 with the passage of new civil rights statutes and the 
692 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:645 
 
federal statutory litigation—Fortune 2000 firms appeared as defendants nearly 60% 
of the time between 1971 and 1991, although the trend in the late 1980s was toward 
parity in defendant and plaintiff appearances.244 Disparities in Fortune 2000’s 
firms’ participation as plaintiffs and defendants persist, by the way, when 
Dunworth and Rogers’s data are adjusted to exclude the large proportion of Fortune 
2000 litigation they studied involving a small group of mega-litigants (mostly 
asbestos companies and large insurers).245  
                                                                                                                 
expansion of remedies and access to the courts (through attorney fee and expanded damages 
provisions).”).  
  Dunworth and Rogers found that in the 1980s, non-insurance contract litigation by 
Fortune 2000 litigants actually lagged trends for other litigants. Dunworth & Rogers, supra 
note 236, at 548. They find a smaller increase in “civil rights and labor” cases between 1971 
and 1991. See id. at 536. The difference reflects, in part, the fact that Hadfield looks only at 
employment discrimination and accommodation discrimination cases, while Dunworth and 
Rogers lump labor disputes, including Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
and National Labor Relations Act cases, into the same category as discrimination cases. The 
latter set of cases, excluding ERISA suits, has experienced a less rapid increase over the last 
thirty years. See Hadfield, supra note 235, at 1288 (showing that the class of employment 
suits—meaning suits involving federal labor law, excluding ERISA—has stayed essentially 
flat between 1970 and 2000). The difference also reflects the fact that employment 
discrimination suits experienced a massive increase post-1990, which is not captured in 
Dunworth and Rogers’s data set, which ends in 1991. See id.  
 244.  Dunworth & Rogers, supra note 236, at 540 (noting that Fortune 2000 firms 
appeared as defendants in 58.7% of statutory and real property cases, excluding civil rights 
and labor suits, where they appeared almost predominately as defendants); see id. at 543 
fig.9 (showing that Fortune 2000 defense-side appearances in these cases fell off in the late 
1980s, reaching rough parity with plaintiff defenses by 1991). 
 245.  For example, the categories of suits that were much more likely to involve these 
“mega litigants” were asbestos products liability litigation and insurance contract litigation. 
But Fortune 2000 appearances in non-asbestos-related tort, civil rights, and labor litigation 
(where Fortune 2000 corporations almost exclusively participate as defendants) continued to 
outnumber their appearance in non-insurance contract litigation (where they are more likely 
to appear as plaintiffs) by a two to one margin. See, e.g., id. at 541 tbl.7 (appearances in non-
asbestos products liability, other torts, and civil rights/labor cases, numbered about 198,000, 
while appearances in non-insurance contract litigation were about 96,000). When the small 
group of mega-Fortune 2000 litigants are excluded from non-asbestos tort litigation, non-
insurance contract litigation, and civil rights suits, other Fortune 2000 litigants still appeared 
in these suits more often than in non-insurance contract litigation, by a roughly three to two 
margin (these lower-volume Fortune 2000 litigants participated in nearly 90,000 of the 
former cases, and less than 60,000 of the later). See, e.g., id. at 546 tbl.8 (figures are derived 
from taking total cases commenced in each category, calculating (1) the number involving of 
Fortune 2000 firms based on the percentage of all cases involving Fortune 2000 litigants in 
these categories, then subtracting (2) the number of these suits involving “mega-litigants” 
based on the percentage of total suits involving those parties). Since their study, the volume 
of civil rights litigation has dramatically increased, while contract litigation has fallen off by 
one-third, meaning that the disparity between defense- and plaintiff-side participation may 
be even greater for these litigants today. See supra text accompanying notes 241, 243. 
  Dunworth and Rogers argue that their number undercuts claims of a “business[] 
litigation explosion.” Dunworth & Rogers, supra note 236, at 560. They also emphasize their 
findings, particularly with respect to contract litigation, undercut overblown claims that large 
institutional parties almost exclusively appear as defendants. Id. at 561. Even so, their 
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The data are suggestive. Based on these numbers, average Fortune 2000 
corporations were likely to reap a net advantage from plaintiff-friendly 
formulations of procedural rules in the steadily declining category of commercial 
contract cases, where they appeared as plaintiffs more often than as defendants. 
Those gains were offset by a disadvantage incurred in the more numerous 
categories of non-contract litigation, where Fortune 2000 firms were more likely to 
appear as a defendant.  
Not surprisingly, then, the plaintiffs’ bar and large corporate litigants are reliable 
antagonists in the rule-making process, which increasingly resembles a zero-sum 
competition between these two groups. The plaintiffs’ bar, naturally, favors 
plaintiff-friendly formulations of procedural rules. Corporate defendants—
supported by allied advocacy groups like the United States Chamber of 
Commerce—support formulations that raise barriers to court access and make it 
easier to terminate litigation earlier and in defendants’ favor.246 Stasis in the rule-
making process over the last forty years suggests neither side is able to secure 
enactment of its preferences.  
If we were to assume the interests of the trial bar and large corporate defendants 
were the only interests at stake in procedural rule making, the case for minimalist 
interpretations of these standards would be straightforward. Fuzzy standards yield a 
range of lower court applications of the standard, some more plaintiff-friendly and 
some defense-friendly, ensuring neither side loses everything that is important to it. 
Of course, if there were a determinate “intermediate” interpretation of pleading 
or summary judgment standards, one that reliably split the difference between 
plaintiffs and defendants, a minimalist interpretation would be unnecessary. But, 
given the incredibly broad welter of cases, claims, pleadings, and evidence to 
which either standard is applied, it’s impossible to specify in advance ground rules 
that, in operation, trim between the interests of either side.  
Skeptical readers will be quick to object that the interests of the trial bar and 
large corporate defendants are not the only interests at stake in procedural rule 
making. And they are right. Outside the narrow confines of corporate boardrooms 
and plaintiffs’ firms, most observers care most about the way that the procedural 
system distributes error—implicating conflicting visions of procedural justice. 
And, today, as procedure has become a battleground for debates over social policy, 
a major component of modern interest group conflict involves a clash among 
competing ideological groups about how to design a just procedural system.247  
                                                                                                                 
figures do underscore that Fortune 2000 firms are more likely to appear as defendants than 
plaintiffs on average, and therefore can expect to gain more, on average, from defendant-
friendly procedural reform. Even Dunworth and Rogers appear to concede as much. See id. 
at 562 (noting that “even if [many companies] themselves have never been subject to costly 
[mega] litigation” they nonetheless have some incentives to favor defendant-friendly 
reforms).   
 246.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 
38, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html?_r=1 
(discussing the business lobby’s litigation reform efforts); see also Wasserman, supra note 
234 (noting that “corporations and government are almost always defendants (and repeat 
defendants at that) who know they will almost exclusively enjoy benefits from a defense-
favorable” procedural regime). 
 247.  See supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text. 
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Even if no organized “interest groups” in the usual “K Street” sense take 
“procedural justice” as their lobbying polestar, many participants in the rule-
making process—academics, broad-minded judges and practitioners, civil rights 
organizations and other ideological groups—care deeply about procedural justice. 
To show respect for competing preferences in the rule-making process, pluralists 
must take these larger interests into account. 
2. Conflicts About Procedural Justice 
When the focus switches to clash among competing theories of procedural 
justice, however, the case for minimalism remains just as strong.  
As we have seen, minimalism is an effective trimming strategy when an 
interpretive choice poses uncertain risks of important losses for many groups no 
matter how the choice is resolved.248 And a choice among formulations of pleading 
and summary judgment presents just this sort of situation: given severe uncertainty 
about the effect of different formulations of pleading or summary judgment rules, 
any formulation creates an uncertain risk of grave losses for adherents of different 
theories of procedural justice. 
Below, I start by reviewing the three major views about procedural justice 
implicated by a choice between pleading and summary judgment, elaborate on the 
conflict and uncertainty that choice among formulations of these standards entails 
for those who hold these views, and end by reviewing why minimalism furthers 
pluralist aims in the face of this conflict. 
a. Procedural Justice 
Procedural designers must confront how to manage, and allocate, the risk of 
error—that is, the risk that deserving plaintiffs fail to recover their losses or 
innocent defendants pay plaintiffs for losses they did not cause. Theories about 
procedural justice provide an account about how to distribute that risk.249 There are, 
in turn, three commonly held ideas about procedural justice.  
 
Welfare Utilitarianism. One camp, wealth-maximizing utilitarians, is indifferent 
to the distribution of error among parties, focusing, instead, on minimizing the total 
administrative and error cost of litigation in aggregate.250 Thus, this camp would be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 248.  See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text. 
 249.  John Rawls distinguishes between two accounts of procedural justice: (1) “perfect” 
procedural justice, and (2) “imperfect” procedural justice. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 74–75 (rev. ed. 1999). In cases of perfect procedural justice, there is an “independent 
criterion” of a just outcome, “defined separately from and prior to the procedure which is to 
be followed,” as well as procedures that are “sure to give the desired outcome.” Id. at 74. In 
cases of imperfect procedural justice, by contrast, procedures are measured by an 
independent criterion for a just outcome, but procedures cannot guarantee that outcome. Id. 
Accounts of imperfect justice discuss how to distribute the risk of error. For an excellent 
systematic treatment of procedural justice, see Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 
S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004).   
 250.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
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indifferent between regimes that distribute the risk of error entirely to plaintiffs, 
and those that spread an equal amount of error evenly among plaintiffs and 
defendants, but cost the same. 
 
Strict Egalitarianism. Where two rules result in roughly equal amounts of error, 
others care about how error is distributed. One common view of “fair” error 
distribution is that, all else equal, rules should spread the risk of error evenly 
among all classes of litigants. If two practices would result in an equal amount of 
error, but one distributes that error equally among classes of litigants, and the other 
does not, adherents of this view would prefer the former practice.251 And, unlike 
welfare utilitarians, strict egalitarians are willing to assume more administrative 
costs in order to ensure fair error distribution.252 
 
Liberal Egalitarianism. By contrast, liberal egalitarians are more willing to 
tolerate an unequal distribution of error if doing so provides insurance against error 
for the least well off. On this view, a practice, either in isolation or in conjunction 
with other practices, that imposes a larger risk of unjust outcomes on corporate 
defendants might be perfectly defensible, if doing so is the price of ensuring that 
less powerful parties are immunized from the untoward consequences of procedural 
error.253   
 
Of course, rich analysis of each theory would reveal nuances and crosscurrents 
far beyond the scope of this Article. The point here, however, is that most people 
tend to sort into three different, readily recognizable views about how error can be 
distributed.254 
                                                                                                                 
961, 1195 (2001); see also Solum, supra note 249, at 254 (discussing utilitarian theories of 
procedural justice). 
 251.  See Solum, supra note 249, at 257 (“In the civil context, the baseline notion seems 
to be that the risks of error should be distributed equally. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants 
should enjoy an advantage in any particular category of cases.”). 
 252.  See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 250, at 1329 (“[N]otions of fairness appear to be 
insensitive to administrative costs. Indeed, some would regard selecting rules on the basis of 
differences in administrative costs as the antithesis of choosing rules on grounds of 
fairness.”). 
 253.  Various accounts of procedural fairness that emphasize the importance of giving the 
disadvantaged their “day in court”—defined broadly to include generous access to discovery 
and trial, regardless of the effect of that generosity on the distribution of error toward 
corporate defendants—reflect this view. For an overview, see William H. Simon, Solving 
Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 127, 130, 133 (2004) (“There is no canonical definition of Legal Liberalism, 
but we know it when we see it. Its tacit indicia include predispositions in favor of plaintiffs 
in tort and civil rights cases, defendants in criminal cases, consumers in commercial cases, 
and workers in employment cases. . . . Legal Liberalism sees law as fundamentally 
concerned with the needs of the wounded and vulnerable.”). 
 254.  Indeed, it is fair to say that most people, even if they have strongly held intuitions 
favoring one of these various approaches, have fuzzy justificatory theories. This is even true 
of academic legal theorists, whose accounts of procedural justice, unfortunately, tend to be 
“thin” rather than “thick.” Solum, supra note 249, at 183. Constructing an account of 
procedural justice is notoriously challenging, particularly for those who ascribe to a non-
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b. Conflict and Uncertainty About Summary Judgment and Pleading 
Below I begin by focusing on a controversial but widely held account of the 
error-distribution effects of summary judgment and pleading rules, elaborate on the 
disagreement about assumptions underpinning that account, and then discuss how 
that account and its competitors fare according to different views about procedural 
justice. The discussion is necessarily grossly simplified—the point, here, is not to 
mount a rigorous defense of a particular view of the dynamics of summary 
judgment or pleading, which would each occupy an entire stand-alone article, but 
to sketch the deep empirical and moral uncertainty about how to structure summary 
judgment and pleading rules. 
i. Summary Judgment 
Confidence in jury accuracy has broken down. Some critics of juries make the 
simple, if crude, claim that juries are, on average, biased against defendants. 
However, the evidence for systematic jury bias is thin; at most, studies suggest 
juries vary more widely around the median in their assessment of complex, high-
stakes cases.255 
Some argue, in turn, that the volatility of jury awards affects defendants, 
particularly institutional defendants, in an indirect way as the effects of jury 
unreliability ripple through the procedural system. For example, many claim 
defendants are more risk averse than plaintiffs, particularly in low probability 
suits.256 If true, even the small threat of a very large jury verdict, particularly in 
                                                                                                                 
consequentialist “fairness” account of procedural justice, because first-order accounts of 
“just” outcomes simply do not determine what to do when the practical realities of 
implementation lead to injustice. If someone commits a battery, but a pleading practice 
results in the dismissal of the case leaving the plaintiff without redress, corrective justice 
tells us an unjust result has occurred because the moral equilibrium has not been restored. 
See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of 
Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 513 (2003) [hereinafter Bone, Agreeing to Fair 
Process]. Yet, corrective justice has nothing to say about how miscarriages of corrective 
justice should be distributed, system-wide, among wronged plaintiffs and innocent 
defendants. See id. The point here, in any event, is not to mount a defense of any particular 
view of procedural justice, but to note that what procedural justice requires is a matter of 
great dispute and uncertainty, about which people tend to sort into three readily identifiable 
camps.  
 255.  See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and 
Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004) (presenting evidence of jury unpredictability in 
punitive damage cases); David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating 
About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000) (finding that jury 
deliberation tends to push jury awards to positions that are more extreme than the assessment 
of individual jurors). 
 256.  See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000) (developing a theory of frivolous litigation based on prospect 
theory’s prediction that defendants will be risk averse with respect to low probability losses, 
while plaintiffs will be risk preferring in the same context). As Charles Silver notes, 
assumptions of defendants’ risk aversion is a prevalent, if often unstated, assumption behind 
most claims that defendants are coerced to pay in terrorem settlements. See Charles Silver, 
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class cases, may lead defendants to settle weak class claims for more than they are 
objectively worth. As Chris Guthrie puts it, “Because trial is more attractive to 
plaintiffs than defendants, plaintiffs are likely to demand more, and defendants are 
likely to offer more, than the expected value of plaintiffs’ claims.”257 
This account is often coupled with an optimistic story about the effect of 
expanded use of summary judgment. By increasing the risk that low-probability 
cases will be tossed before trial, expanding the availability of summary judgment 
reduces the risk large defendants will face a volatile jury in very weak cases, 
reducing the tendency of those defendants to settle for more than the value of the 
claim. At the same time, on this view, even moderately low-probability suits can 
survive even the most aggressive possible interpretations of federal summary 
judgment standards. As a result, expanding the availability of summary judgment 
will reduce defendants’ incentives to settle in excess of the value of very weak 
claims, without creating an offsetting risk of erroneous summary judgment in 
meritorious suits. 258 
These claims are far from universally accepted. Some suggest “that the 
problems with juries are greatly exaggerated,”259 while others dispute claims that 
                                                                                                                 
“We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 
1373–76, 1421 n.271 (2003). Guthrie’s theory, however, also posits that the risk profiles of 
plaintiffs and defendants switch as the expected value of the claim increases, which, if true, 
complicates the picture considerably. See infra note 260 and accompanying text. Judge 
Frank Easterbrook makes a slightly different claim: corporate managers’ interests diverge 
from those of investors and bondholders because managers have a vested interest in the 
solvency of the corporation, on which their jobs depend. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 
282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002); see also J.B. Heaton, Settlement Pressure, 25 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 264 (2005) (developing a similar claim). 
 257.  Guthrie, supra note 256, at 169; see also Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, 
Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1849, 1853–54 (2004) (noting, albeit criticizing, the view that the “[c]lass action . . . 
exacerbat[es] the nuisance-value settlement problem . . . to the systematic disadvantage of 
defendants”). 
 258.  In addition, by aggregating claims, class certification magnifies the risks of jury 
volatility, as one erratically unfavorable jury award in an aggregated suit can be disastrous 
for a defendant. As an example, imagine that 1000 claims worth $100 each go trial, and each 
claim has a 50% chance of victory. If all 1000 cases go to trial separately, the defendant 
faces an expected liability of $500,000. The chance of being found liable in every case is, 
however, a practical impossibility; over a series of one thousand trials, the actual result is not 
likely to deviate from the expected result. Now imagine a scenario in which there is one 
aggregate trial of all 1000 claims before a single jury, which will find the defendant liable to 
all class members 50% of the time. In this case, the expected value of the claim is the same, 
but now, defendants face two possible outcomes—either no liability or liability to the tune of 
$1,000,000. As a result, a jury trial of a large class action imposes a far greater risk of 
variance than that posed by seriatim litigation. And, if juries are volatile and sometimes 
award amounts well in excess of the expected value of the claim, the worst-case scenario of 
class litigation will exceed $1,000,000, perhaps by a wide margin. This example is a 
variation on one provided by Charles Silver. See Silver, supra note 256, at 1370. 
 259.  Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 
689 n.429 (2001). For a defense of the civil jury, see Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in 
America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1993). 
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defendants are risk averse.260 If juries are not volatile and defendants are not risk 
averse, then defendants have no reason to settle in excess of the value of claims.261 
Others add that, whatever problems plague jury decision making, wider availability 
of summary judgment carries its own costs. Some claim it skews the risk of error 
toward plaintiffs. The theory is that judges have powerful incentives to clear their 
dockets and therefore, if given the opportunity, will systematically decide summary 
judgment in defendants’ favor, even in cases where juries would have come out the 
other way.262 Some, in addition, argue that the expense of expanded summary 
judgment has been understated, and that factoring in its real expense suggests 
summary judgment is not cost justified.263  
Which account is true is unknown. Jury decision making is not well 
understood.264 Empirical study of settlements and frivolous litigation is notoriously 
difficult, in part because empiricists lack a settled definition of frivolous litigation, 
benchmarks for identifying low-expected-value suits, or ways of randomizing case 
samples with respect to merit.265 In addition, many settlements are unreported, and 
their terms are often confidential.266 We know little about the actual risk profile of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 260.  See, e.g., Silver, supra note 256, at 1409–16 (summarizing literature and 
concluding that the argument for corporate risk aversion “has not been made persuasively”). 
J.B. Heaton also claims that, even assuming corporate managers are risk averse, risk 
aversion would lead managers to settle only moderately low-probability cases; managers, 
nonetheless, prefer trial in very low probability cases. Heaton, supra note 256, at 270. If that 
is true, beefed-up summary judgment standards may not eliminate most moderately low 
probability cases (assuming such cases are supported by evidence, but evidence juries are not 
likely to believe); if so, summary judgment may not have any effect on defendants’ 
propensity to settle in excess of the suit’s expected value. Finally, Chris Guthrie notes that 
the risk profile of plaintiffs and defendants may switch as the claims increase in merit—
giving defendants leverage to compel settlements for less than expected value of claims in 
suits with a higher expected value. See Guthrie, supra note 256, at 215. If so, the error risks 
imposed on defendants may be offset by compensating risks imposed on plaintiffs. See id. at 
215–16. 
 261.  See, e.g., Silver, supra note 256, at 1409–16.  
 262.  See John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 542 
(2007) (developing this argument). 
 263.  See id. at 547. 
 264.  See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Redistributive Litigation—Judicial Innovation, Private 
Expectations, and the Shadow of International Law, 88 VA. L. REV. 789, 863–64 (2002) 
(noting that jury decision making is “enigmatic” and “poorly understood” and surveying 
difficulties with empirical study of the jury). 
 265.  Guthrie, supra note 256, at 214 (“[E]mpirical data on the frivolous litigation 
‘problem’ is unavailable.”); see also Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. 
L. REV. 519, 527–28 (1997) [hereinafter Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits] (making a similar 
point and noting “the many obstacles to reliable empirical work,” including problems 
defining and identifying frivolous litigation). 
 266.  See, e.g., Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement out of the Shadows: 
Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 664 
(2001) (“Given the prevalence of settlements today, it is surprising how little we know about 
them. . . . [G]iven that so many settlements are confidential, it is surprising that we know 
anything about them at all.”). 
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corporate defendants.267 As a result, we don’t know the extent to which settlements 
exceed the expected value of suits. In the absence of hard data on all of these 
variables, the debate about the effect of jury decision making has, notoriously, 
centered around anecdotes.268  
How would those with differing views of procedural justice assess these 
accounts? Much depends on which story is credited. Let’s start with the pessimistic 
account of jury decision making. First, assuming at least a reasonable possibility 
that poor litigants are more likely to appear as plaintiffs than as defendants, liberal 
egalitarians will not mind that jury volatility has an unequal effect on large 
institutional defendants, as the unequal systemic effects of jury volatility increase 
the bargaining power of less powerful parties. Thus, all else being equal, if juries 
and judges commit the same frequency and magnitude of error on average, but the 
greater volatility in the size of jury awards place plaintiffs in a better bargaining 
position against corporate defendants, liberal egalitarians would favor strict limits 
on the availability of summary judgment, because limiting its availability improves 
the bargaining position of the least well off. 
Strict egalitarians, by contrast, will be concerned by jury volatility because it 
pressures a class of repeat-player litigants who appear more often as defendants 
(large corporations and other large institutional parties) to settle claims in excess of 
their value. If jury volatility imposes an unequal risk of error on a discrete, 
identifiable class of defendants, while expanded use of summary judgment 
distributes errors more evenly across plaintiffs and defendants, strict egalitarians 
would favor making summary judgment more readily available.  
Welfare utilitarians, finally, will assess the risks that volatile juries impose on 
defendants in light of the litigation costs of more robust use of summary judgment. 
Assuming those costs are not excessive relative to the gains summary judgment 
achieves in error reduction—a widely held, if contested, assumption269—utilitarians 
would favor the regime in which summary judgment is more widely available.  
This class of views shifts if the opposite assumptions are credited. If juries are 
not volatile, defendants are not risk averse, summary judgment is incredibly 
expensive, and beefed-up summary judgment imposes outsized risks on plaintiffs, 
all theories should converge around limits on summary judgment.  
In our world—where no one knows either the direction or magnitude of error 
occasioned by juries or the effect and costs of expanded use of summary 
judgment—liberal egalitarians will always prefer tight limits on summary 
judgment. Strict egalitarians and welfare utilitarians, by contrast, face an uncertain 
prospect of serious losses if either a strict or lax approach to summary judgment 
were adopted wholesale, depending on which account turns out to be true.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 267.  See, e.g., Silver, supra note 256, at 1409–16 (noting the dearth of empirical 
evidence on corporate managers’ actual risk profiles).  
 268.  Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 257, at 1851 n.3 (claiming that “there is a paucity 
of empirical research substantiating [the] extent” of the problem with nuisance-value 
settlements). 
 269.  E.g., Bronsteen, supra note 262, passim (noting the assumption is widely held, but 
contesting it). 
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ii. Pleading 
Even if summary judgment is widely available, it may not cure the unequal 
distribution of error risks if the discovery phase of litigation that precedes use of 
summary judgment entails independent error distribution problems that summary 
judgment cannot cure. Here, again, there is a pessimistic story and an optimistic 
story about the effects of the discovery phase on the distribution of error in civil 
litigation. 
According to the pessimistic account, jury volatility is only one source of 
settlement pressure and a minor source at that. The asymmetric costs of discovery 
and the sequence of class certification play a larger role. First, discovery is 
expensive. Defendants, particularly institutional defendants, it is claimed, bear most 
of that expense because it is “cheaper to propound discovery requests, particularly 
document requests and interrogatories, than to respond to them.”270 Plaintiffs, in 
turn, “control the discovery agenda”—“[i]f they choose to propound discovery 
requests, defendants are obliged to respond . . . but when, how and whether to 
review the responses are decisions entirely within plaintiffs’ control.”271 And, 
finally, large institutional defendants simply have more raw information—and, 
therefore, are more vulnerable to the imposition of discovery search costs. As 
Frank Easterbrook puts it,  
Large litigants have files—warehouses full of files. The adversary can 
demand that they be searched, at great cost; the adversary can notice the 
depositions of 20 corporate officers. . . . [I]n a fight between the big and 
the small, the big are more likely to be the targets of impositional 
discovery requests; in a fight between the rich and the poor, money 
flows in one direction only, no matter who is in the right.272 
                                                                                                                 
 
 270.  Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 548 (1991). Alexander’s focus is on securities fraud 
litigation, but, as Frank Easterbrook notes, the problem with asymmetric costs of discovery 
is a general one in cases involving large institutional defendants. See infra note 272 and 
accompanying text. 
 271.  Alexander, supra note 270, at 549.  
 272.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Commentary, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 643 
(1989). Of course, this account is greatly simplified. In the first sophisticated asymmetric 
cost model of frivolous litigation, proposed by David Rosenberg and Steven Shavell, 
plaintiffs file suit when the cost of filing is less than the cost to the defendant of responding. 
See D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance 
Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4 (1985). Rosenberg and Shavell’s model was criticized 
because the defendant’s initial cost of responding to a complaint is often small; defendants 
are unlikely to settle to avoid that cost; and, once the defendant responds, she can then 
impose additional litigation costs on the plaintiff. Later, slightly more nuanced asymmetric 
cost models of frivolous litigation suggested that, even if the initial cost of responding to a 
complaint is small, defendants may nonetheless settle to avoid the later cost of litigation 
assuming plaintiffs can credibly threaten to impose substantial costs on a defendant over 
time by sinking costs in stages. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning 
the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996) (proposing an 
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In addition, class certification invariably takes place before discovery on the 
merits is completed and, therefore, before a meaningful opportunity to use 
summary judgment.273 When certification is granted, corporations accrue 
additional, often substantial, dead weight costs on their ability to tap capital 
markets during the ensuing merits discovery.274 Moreover, because certification so 
markedly increases the variance of potential outcomes at trial, risk-averse 
defendants may want to avoid even a very small chance a suit certified as a class 
action will survive summary judgment.275 
To avoid these costs, defendants, according to this account, settle low 
probability suits before the completion of merits discovery (thereby foregoing the 
opportunity for summary judgment) and, in turn, pay a premium, above the 
expected value of the suit, to do so.276  
Of course, as with the debate over summary judgment, the basic account that 
underpins this conflict, though widely accepted,277 is vigorously contested. Data on 
the frequency of frivolous litigation are undeveloped.278 Some models of frivolous 
litigation suggest incentives to file nuisance-value suits do not strictly correlate 
with discovery cost, but rather tend to cluster around different types of claims 
based on additional factors, including asymmetries in the information available to 
plaintiffs and defendants about the merits of the suit.279 Evidence can be found to 
both support and contradict the claim that discovery is overly expensive—but no 
studies tell us much about the cost of litigation relative to the expected value of the 
suit, and what studies have been undertaken measure the incidence and volume of 
discovery requests but do not attempt to measure “the time and expense required 
                                                                                                                 
alternative to the Rosenberg/Shavell model); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract 
a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988) (criticizing the Rosenberg/Shavell model). 
For my purposes, however, the key point is that many accounts of frivolous litigation assume 
defendants are willing to settle to avoid significant litigation costs. 
 273.  This is partly because Rule 23 urges certification earlier rather than later in the suit, 
partly because the merits are only incidentally relevant to class certification, and partly, as a 
pragmatic matter, because it is difficult to design a full-throated discovery plan until 
certification has been resolved, as the terms of certification determine how a claim will be 
proven. 
 274.  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A 
Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993); 
Heaton, supra note 256, at 272 (“[A] credible commitment to a policy of hedging 
catastrophic outcomes [through settlement] may . . . allow the firm to lower its borrowing 
costs and the severity of its bond covenants.”). 
 275.  See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 276.  For an influential account along these lines, with a focus on securities litigation, see 
generally Alexander, supra note 270. 
 277.  Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 873, 920 (2009) [hereinafter Bone, Regulation of Court Access] (noting the 
discovery-cost account of nuisance-value settlements is widely accepted). 
 278. See supra note 265. 
 279.  See, e.g., Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, supra note 265, passim; Bone, 
Regulation of Court Access, supra note 277, at 920 (“[Concerns about the cost of discovery] 
explain[] only part of the meritless suit problem, and probably not a very substantial part at 
that. There is strong reason to believe that informational asymmetry is a much more 
important cause.”).  
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either to propound discovery or to respond to it.”280 Finally, as with summary 
judgment, claims about defendants’ risk aversion are contested.281 In the end, then, 
as with summary judgment, the debate, lacking conclusive hard data, is driven by 
modeling and anecdotes. 
If the pessimistic story is credited, summary judgment cannot cure the error-
distribution risks of discovery or class certification. However, motions to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, which precede both merits discovery and class 
certification, can cure error-distribution risks by allowing a court to toss low 
probability suits before either discovery or class certification takes place.  
To see this, consider a pair of extremely simplified hypothetical pleading 
regimes (in which amounts at stake are kept small for simplicity’s sake). The first is 
a Type 1 error regime—in it, suits can never be dismissed for failure to allege facts 
supporting any allegations. As a result, it generates error, but—putting aside trial 
courts’ errors in interpretation of the law—only results in false positives, or Type 1 
errors (i.e., errors that result when an unmeritorious case is sent on to discovery). 
This regime reflects one possible interpretation of Rule 8—an interpretation carved 
out by the traditional Conley v. Gibson rule, which effectively let suits regardless of 
merits into discovery, yielding only Type 1 errors. 
In this regime, all lawsuits are for $100, 60% of lawsuits are meritorious, and 
meritorious suits always recover the full amount of compensatory damages. In the 
unmeritorious cases, however, defendants also always lose motions to dismiss and 
invariably settle to avoid discovery costs. In these cases, defendants settle for $30. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 280.  Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil 
Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 796 (1998) (surveying academic studies of discovery costs 
and cataloguing gaps in research). In addition, theories that care about the equal distribution 
of risk should be sensitive to the distribution of risk at a systemic level, not simply at the 
pleading stage. See, e.g., Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process, supra note 254, at 534. And, in the 
real world, plaintiffs who do not suffer a risk of error at the pleading stage may suffer a 
heightened compensating risk of error in other, subsequent stages of litigation. A prime 
source of potential error is class certification. First, many claim that collusive settlements 
between defendants and plaintiffs’ attorneys in meritorious suits are pervasive and result in 
settlements that shortchange class members but yield hefty fees for class attorneys and peace 
for corporate defendants. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial 
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Litigation, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877, 883–89 (1987). Second, in the last ten years, circuit courts have increasingly 
imposed a “hard look” approach on class certification. See Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All 
Over Again? Pre-Trial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011) (manuscript at 29), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1568127 (discussing shift among circuits in favor of requiring affirmative proof 
that class certification standards have been satisfied). Erroneous class certification decisions, 
in turn, impose their own distinct error costs: the inability to certify claims as a litigation 
class can doom otherwise meritorious claims that are too expensive to litigate separately or, 
alternatively, can spawn a subpar class settlement if claims that cannot be litigated as a class 
but can be certified under marginally more liberal standards for settlement class certification. 
Unfortunately, empirical data on rates of class certification error are virtually nonexistent, a 
function of the difficulty in formulating an objective measure of accurate certification 
decisions and class settlement values. 
 281.  See supra note 260 and accompanying text.  
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All meritorious suits result in $60 in total litigation costs, accounting for aggregate 
attorney time (by plaintiffs’ and defendants’ lawyers) spent in pre-trial 
investigation, motion practice, and discovery; court time spent administering 
litigation and appeals; and opportunity costs for courts and litigants associated with 
time lost that could be spent on other litigation or more productive private 
endeavors. Settled unmeritorious suits result in $35 in total litigation costs. 
The second regime is a “mixed error” regime, which produces both Type 1 
errors and Type 2 errors. The latter type of error results when a motion to dismiss 
yields a false negative (i.e., a meritorious claim is dismissed). This regime 
corresponds to various robust “heightened pleading” interpretations of Twombly or 
Iqbal, which rigorously screen complaints based on their factual specificity, 
resulting in a mix of Type 1 and Type 2 errors. In this regime, then, 60% of suits 
are meritorious; 40% are unmeritorious. Plaintiffs and defendants face the same 
schedule of recoveries or losses as in the earlier example. Administrative costs 
remain the same. Here, though, 40% of suits are dismissed. Error, finally, is 
random with respect to party status: 20% of suits result in a Type 1 error, and 20% 
of suits involve a Type 2 error.  
Here, adherents of different theories of procedural justice will divide over the 
merits of the two regimes:  
• On a welfare utilitarian account of procedural justice, the second 
regime is preferable. For every ten suits in each regime, the sum of 
expected error and administrative costs in the two regimes are 
unequal (on average, $620 in the first ([4 x $30 in error costs] + [6 x 
$60 in administrative costs] + [4 x $35 in administrative costs]) and 
$570 in the second ([2 x $0] + [2 x $30 in error costs] + [2 x $100 in 
error costs] + [4 x $60 in administrative costs] + [2 x $35 in 
administrative costs]), in a way that favors the mixed regime. 
Assuming plaintiffs tend to be poorer and defendants richer, a liberal 
egalitarian will favor the very liberal “Type 1 error” regime, which 
provides more insurance for the least well-off.  
• By contrast, an adherent of a strict egalitarian theory of 
procedural justice would prefer the “mixed error” regime. Because, 
in both regimes, the expected error rate is the same—40% of suits 
result in an outcome that does not restore the moral equilibrium—
neither is superior along the dimension of accuracy. But the second 
regime is obviously superior to the first along the dimension of error 
distribution, as it distributes the risk of error equally among 
plaintiffs and defendants. The difference in magnitude of losses to 
plaintiffs and defendants in each regime is immaterial, assuming—
as most fairness theorists do—that parties’ interests in justice are 
incommensurable: only the frequency and distribution of error in a 
corrective justice sense (that is, failure to restore the moral 
equilibrium) matters.282 
                                                                                                                 
 
 282.  One can, incidentally, also imagine a variety of subtle variations on each theory that 
might lead adherents to disagree amongst themselves about the merits of each regime. 
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Once again, though, if optimistic assumptions are credited, the alignment shifts. 
Liberal egalitarians continue to favor a Type 1 error pleading regime. But now 
other adherents of justice will favor a Type 1 error regime, too. For example, if 
discovery is not expensive or coercive, or if defendants are not risk averse, claims 
that survive a motion to dismiss will either be terminated through a dispositive 
ruling or settled at their fair value later, after discovery. In that case, a “mixed” 
approach to pleading will result in less accuracy. And it will shift the risk of error 
disproportionately to plaintiffs. In that event, strict egalitarians would favor strict 
limits on motions to dismiss.  
In the foregoing example, moderate adjustments downward in the cost of 
litigation saved by increased early dismissal, or the magnitude of in terrorem 
settlement premiums paid by defendants, would result in a higher sum of 
administrative costs and error costs in the mixed regime than in the Type 1 regime, 
making a Type 1 regime the winner for welfare utilitarians as well.  
Our world, finally, is a world of deep uncertainty about the frequency of 
frivolous litigation, the magnitude of discovery costs relative to the expected value 
of suits, the effect of those costs on defendants’ propensity to settle unmeritorious 
claims, and the effect of more aggressive formulations of federal pleading 
standards. In our world, liberal egalitarians nonetheless have every reason to favor 
limiting motions to dismiss. But strict egalitarians and welfare utilitarians face an 
uncertain prospect of severe normative harm if either a strict or lax approach to 
motions to dismiss is adopted, depending which account of the underlying facts on 
the ground turns out to be true. 
c. Reciprocity Through Hedging 
As we have seen, very liberal pleading rules and summary judgment rules are a 
win-win for liberal egalitarians, no matter how the underlying empirical uncertainty 
about error distribution effects is resolved. But when adherents of strict egalitarian 
or welfare utilitarian theories of justice must choose between permissive and 
restrictive formulations of summary judgment or pleading, they confront enormous 
uncertainty. They can identify the possible outcomes of the choice—the chosen 
standard may distribute risk equally (the best case scenario from a strict egalitarian 
standpoint) or result in an extreme distribution of the risk of error against particular 
class of litigants (the worst case scenario from a similar normative standpoint)—but 
have no idea which outcome is more likely under any given formulation. 
As a result, a choice of pleading and summary judgment standards is a classic 
example of the kind of “multi-group conflict in the face of severe uncertainty” 
discussed in the last Part. The wholesale adoption of very liberal pleading and 
summary judgment standards gives an enormous windfall to liberal egalitarians. 
But, assuming groups are averse to uncertainty and exhibit maximin preferences, 
very liberal pleading standards also create an intolerably uncertain risk of very bad 
outcomes for efficiency-minded welfare utilitarians and for strict egalitarians.  
Opaque formulations of summary judgment and pleading standards—like the 
“metaphysical doubt” standard in the Celotex trilogy, or “plausibility” in 
Twombly—in turn, can trim between the competing claims of these different 
visions. By articulating summary judgment and pleading standards in an ambiguous 
way, the Supreme Court creates space for some lower courts to continue applying 
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pleading and summary judgment standards quite liberally, giving liberal 
egalitarians some of what they want. But, that ambiguity also creates space for 
other courts to take less liberal approaches. On the reasonable assumption that 
different approaches offset each other—if a less liberal approach produces good 
results from the standpoint of strict egalitarians and welfare utilitarians, a liberal 
approach is likely to produce bad results, and vice versa—mixing things up hedges 
against an intolerably uncertain risk of very bad outcomes that the wholesale 
adoption of very liberal pleading standards (and other determinate formulations) 
threatens for either theory.283 
For example, depending on which empirical account sketched earlier is true, 
strict egalitarians face grave systematic error if a very liberal pleading regime is 
adopted wholesale, or if an equally strict but opposite approach to pleading—say, 
one requiring plaintiffs to allege evidentiary facts akin to a summary-judgment type 
showing, as some have interpreted Iqbal to require—is enacted. A fuzzy, 
minimalist pleading standard, in turn, may not produce an equal distribution of 
error across classes of litigants, but diverse approaches, cutting in different 
directions, hedge against the unknown risk of extreme inequality in error 
distribution threatened if any particular approach were adopted system-wide. 
The same point holds for welfare utilitarians. On one set of assumptions, a less 
liberal pleading regime will minimize the sum of error and administrative costs 
more than a very liberal pleading rule. On another account, a very liberal pleading 
rule will minimize that sum. For welfare utilitarians, like strict egalitarians, a 
plausible maximin solution is to mix things up—which, here, as for other views of 
procedural justice, may not result in the best outcome, but hedges against risk of 
the worst, by averaging the costs associated with either a lax or a strict approach to 
pleading.  
In this context, then, a partisan liberal egalitarian would not flinch at imposing a 
very liberal pleading regime. But a pluralist would favor minimalism. Under a 
minimalist standard, no adherent of any theory is guaranteed everything they want. 
But a minimalist standard guarantees a rough-and-ready form of equality between 
theories. It gives liberal egalitarians some of what they want, while hedging against 
                                                                                                                 
 
 283.  The same point is also applicable to a decision maker undecided about the merits of 
a welfare utilitarian, strict egalitarian, or liberal egalitarian account of imperfect procedural 
justice—and, given the fuzziness of the justificatory theories for each account, there are 
likely a large number of people who are in exactly this position. If an undecided decision 
maker interprets, say, pleading standards after the fashion of a permissive Type 1 error 
regime, but later decides that the strict egalitarian account of procedural justice is correct, he 
faces a risk of extreme moral error if the pessimistic account of error distribution threatened 
by discovery sketched above turns out to be true. Interpreting the standard in a minimalist 
way, with the expectation that lower courts will adopt different, inconsistent interpretations, 
hedges against that risk. If, by contrast, the decision maker interprets pleading standards in a 
fuzzy, indeterminate way, and later decides the liberal egalitarian account of imperfect 
procedural justice is correct, diverse lower court decision making also hedges against the risk 
of an extreme distribution of error toward less-well-off plaintiffs. (And, in addition, 
minimalist interpretations of pleading standards are easier to distinguish and reverse, in areas 
where the risk to the least-well-off plaintiffs is greatest, than a precedent imposing a bright-
line rule.)  
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the intolerably uncertain risk of very bad outcomes that a wholesale adoption of 
very liberal pleading standards poses for strict egalitarians and welfare 
utilitarians.284 And it mimics the essential terms of any fair deal among equals: no 
group guarantees everything it wants by forcing the others to assume all the 
risks.285 
C. Some Final Objections Considered 
A standard objection to the foregoing case for minimalist summary judgment 
and pleading standards focuses on the value of legal clarity.286 Minimalist 
interpretations of these standards obviously create confusion about legal standards, 
and that has its costs: lawyers must spend more time debating the meaning of these 
decisions in ever lengthier briefs, while judges must spend more time in already 
crowded dockets writing opinions interpreting them.  
The objection is strongest if it takes the form of what Adrian Vermeule calls an 
“all else equal” argument.287 Although, he says, “[t]he possible effects of various 
courses of action . . . [that] will indeed come to pass often lie well beyond the limits 
of human calculation,” decision makers need not “retreat into paralysis.”288 
“Rather, they eliminate imponderables from both sides of the scales and focus 
instead on the variables that can be grasped,” all else equal.289 Here, determinate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 284.  For examples of “hedging” arguments in other legal contexts, see, for example, 
Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1594 (2007) 
(arguing that in the context of questions about the propriety of appointing lay justices, “it 
would be best to mix things up a bit, hedging our bets with at least a minimum of 
professional diversity”); Adrian Vermeule, System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 66 (2009) (arguing that in the face of uncertainty about which approach to 
interpreting the Constitution is best, and given the prevalence of disagreement about 
interpretive theories, a “methodologically diverse judiciary is, plausibly, the best way to 
minimize the risk” of “wholesale adoption of one approach and wholesale rejection of its 
competitors”). 
 285.  To be sure, the case for interpreting a procedural rule to minimize inequality in 
expected dissatisfaction comes into its own when no interest group is capable of enacting its 
preferences. Were we to think that liberal egalitarians have the muscle to enact their 
preferred interpretation through the rule-making process, courts, as faithful agents of the 
legislative polity, have a duty to choose interpretations that hold out a reasonable chance of 
minimizing the dissatisfaction of the dominant coalition. Here, though, given stasis in the 
rule-making process and the widely shared perception that this stasis is the result of a 
stalemate between differing interests in the procedural polity, it is reasonable to think no 
group has the muscle to enact its preferences. It is especially reasonable to think that liberal 
egalitarians lack that muscle, given their inability to secure an override, through the rule-
making process, of the Celotex trilogy or to address, through the rule-making process, the 
widespread, two decade-long lower court nonacquiescence to the Conley standard.  
 286.  See, e.g., Sunstein, Testing Minimalism, supra note 115, at 128 (noting that 
complaints about uncertainty are a common critique of minimalism).  
 287.  Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 123–26 (2000). 
 288.  ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 174 (2006). 
 289.  Id. 
2011] PROCEDURE’S AMBIGUITY 707 
 
pleading and summary judgment standards carry the imponderable risk of severe 
error or litigation costs. But, all else equal, minimalist interpretations will certainly 
result in more decision costs. As a result, the argument would go, we should 
assume away the imponderable risks and pick clear interpretations of pleading or 
summary judgment standards. 
For pluralists, given the assumptions grounding this Article, this argument is not 
compelling. An all-else-equal argument depends on the key assumption that 
decision makers are untroubled by uncertainty. By contrast, decision makers who 
are averse to uncertainty “will not simply treat ignorance of probabilities as a 
warrant for assigning equal probabilities to alternatives.”290 Rather, the rational 
choice for choosers exhibiting a significant degree of uncertainty aversion is 
maximin, which guarantees a “certain minimum” payoff.291 Indeed, uncertainty-
averse decision makers are, by definition, willing to pay a premium to avoid 
participating in a lottery with unknown odds of a bad outcome.292  
The assumption underpinning the preceding argument for minimalism is that 
interest groups are averse to uncertainty and therefore will not treat the speculative 
costs and benefits of clear rules as though they “cancel out.” Rather, in the face of 
uncertainty about the effect of adopting a clear rule, they compare competing 
approaches based on maximin and pick the approach that eliminates the worst-case 
outcome.293 For either strict egalitarians or welfare utilitarians, whatever decision 
costs are incurred by abandoning the clarity of an across-the-board formulation of 
summary judgment and pleading standards are swamped by the grave “worst case” 
error or litigation costs avoided by adopting a minimalist standard. To avoid those 
costs, uncertainty-averse decision makers will, accordingly, be willing to pay 
minimalism’s comparatively modest price tag. 
The assumption that interest groups are averse to uncertainty is consistent with 
the case for adopting trimming interpretations in the first place, which assumes that 
interest groups will select default rules based on maximin, driven by aversion to 
uncertainty about their future endowments and preferences. It is consistent with 
experimental evidence: “a general preference to act on more information rather 
than less, on known risks rather than under uncertainty, is [a] widespread and 
dependable” feature of human decision making and “experimental results are 
remarkably robust” on this point.294  
And, again, the structure of the modern rule-making process only underscores 
the plausibility of ascribing these preferences to procedural interest groups. The 
modern rule-making process, as we have seen, is designed to promote 
“accommodation of competing interest groups” through consensus and 
compromise, by opening the door to “intense” interest group pressure on rule 
makers.295 And, in the face of severe disagreement among interest groups, the rule-
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making process, for decades, has yielded a stalemate, with a resulting output that 
consists of “highly general rules that leave most of the difficult normative questions 
to the discretion of” later decision makers—namely, “trial judges in individual 
cases.”296 Variation across district courts has been the inevitable, predictable 
result.297 The most straightforward explanation for interest groups’ continuing 
acceptance of the institutional arrangements that produce this deadlock is that they 
are uncertain about their fortunes in a more dynamic, proactive rule-making 
system, and averse to that uncertainty. If so, they will be just as averse to the 
unknown risk of bad consequences entailed by determinate formulations of 
summary judgment and pleading rules.  
It’s also important to stress that the assumption that interest groups are averse to 
uncertainty isn’t inconsistent with earlier claims that litigants in the procedural 
arena may, or may not, be averse to risk. Risk-averse people avoid bets that present 
known, or quantifiable, odds of a terrible loss.298 Uncertainty-averse people avoid 
bets where the odds are unknown. Uncertainty aversion, in turn, operates 
“independently of . . . attitudes to risk.”299 A risk-preferring professional gambler, 
for example, may be willing to take a risky bet with known odds of a bad outcome, 
but unwilling to place a bet with unknown odds.300  
It is, in turn, uncertainty about litigants’ risk tolerance, and many other 
variables, that helps drive the case for minimalism. In litigation, sophisticated, 
repeat-player defendants may know the range of possible outcomes of litigation, 
and feel confident about the odds of those outcomes. If, however, they are risk 
averse, they may want to avoid, say, jury trial if they think juries threaten a known 
risk, even a small one, of an unusually large judgment. The claim here is that 
welfare utilitarians and strict egalitarians will prefer a mix of approaches to 
summary judgment or pleading in light of the uncertainty about litigants’ actual 
taste for risk—and in light of uncertainty about the many, many other important 
variables that also affect the distribution of litigation error.301 
One final variation on the decision-costs objection is most compelling. Before 
the Supreme Court decided either the Celotex trilogy or Twombly and Iqbal, lower 
courts already varied in their interpretation of summary judgment and pleading 
standards. Against that baseline, an objection based on decision costs seems more 
powerful. The Supreme Court’s decisions impose significant short-term costs as 
lower courts and lawyers puzzle over the meaning of the cases. But those decisions 
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reap marginal gains for pluralists, given that lower courts already exhibited a mix 
of lax and strict approaches to either standard. To be sure, Twombly and Iqbal may 
result in a somewhat different mix of those approaches. But, as we have seen, any 
significant mix of lower court approaches to pleading will do a reasonable job at 
trimming between interest group preferences. As a result, Twombly and Iqbal do 
not obviously improve on the pre-Twombly status quo, from a pluralist standpoint. 
What’s the point, then, of the Court’s decisions? Wouldn’t it have been better for 
the Court to conserve on new decision and transition costs by leaving well enough 
alone—by, say, denying certiorari in Celotex or Twombly? 
Here, though, pluralists might respond in three ways. First, the objection is 
faithless to the Supreme Court’s role in the federal hierarchy. It envisions the 
“Supreme” Court’s acquiescence in lower courts’ refusals to comply with the 
Court’s own prior precedents, which commanded adherence to bright-line, and very 
liberal, formulations of summary judgment and pleading standards—liberal 
formulations which, if actually enforced against lower courts, would benefit only 
some competing interest groups, while imposing an unacceptably uncertain risk of 
severe losses on others. Fidelity to its institutional role requires the Court to enforce 
those precedents—and therefore embrace an antipluralist role—or reformulate them 
in a way that creates precedential space for heterogeneous lower court practice.  
Second, in any event, prior to Celotex or Twombly, the Court, at best, passively 
acquiesced in the variation in lower court approaches through its unwillingness to 
enforce its prior precedent against rebellious lower courts. For those pluralists who 
view the ethic of mutual respect as a moral imperative,302 there is all the difference 
in the world between a Court that timidly tolerates a pattern of lower court 
decisions that, in practice, shows equal respect to different preferences, and a Court 
that embraces that pattern actively and affirmatively. 
Finally, to the extent this objection is intended as an argument in support of 
certain legislative proposals to overturn Twombly and Iqbal, it is especially 
uncompelling. Various legislative proposals percolating through Congress attempt 
to restore the pre-Twombly and Iqbal status quo.303 For example, a proposal by 
Stephen Burbank would restore the law of pleading as it existed on May 20, 2007, 
the day before Twombly was decided.304 Of course, even conceding, for the sake of 
argument, equivalence between the pre-Twombly status quo and Twombly from a 
pluralist standpoint, a legislative effort to restore the pre-Twombly status quo will 
impose yet another new wave of decision and transition costs on the legal system. 
The proposed bills, after all, raise their own interpretive problems. For example, 
Burbank’s proposed statutory language does not clearly restore all lower court 
pleading precedents that pre-date Twombly. It restores those “consistent with” pre-
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Twombly Supreme Court pleading precedent.305 Because rebellious lower courts 
attempted to justify their heightened approaches to pleading based on often-
disingenuous readings of pre-Twombly Supreme Court precedent, or even ignored 
that precedent entirely, Burbank’s proposal will inevitably spawn new threshold 
litigation over which pre-Twombly lower court precedents Congress thinks lower 
courts should follow.  
Here, then, an all-else-equal argument cuts in favor of, not against, Twombly and 
Iqbal: faced with legislative proposals that are not any more attractive than 
Twombly and Iqbal from a pluralist standpoint, pluralists should, all else equal, 
favor avoiding a whole new wave of decision and transition costs by sticking with 
the new, post-Twombly status quo.  
CONCLUSION 
Cases like the Celotex trilogy and Twombly are widely viewed as terrible 
mistakes. At a minimum, no one—neither critics nor apologists—defends the 
vagueness of the standards adopted in either case. But given some plausible 
assumptions, there is a robust pluralist case that can be made for the Celotex trilogy 
or Twombly, which emphasizes, and celebrates, their opacity—and the 
disagreement among lower courts that follows in their wake. 
Pluralists of the stripe I have focused on in this Article think that in the face of a 
legislative stalemate, courts should trim between the claims of different interest 
groups competing for judicial recognition. My focus has been on “interest groups” 
broadly conceived—including not just the trial bar or corporate lobby, but rule 
makers and interested observers who view procedural reform through the prism of 
competing visions of procedural justice. The argument, at all levels, assumes that 
each group shares a common trait: they are averse to uncertainty and, in the face of 
uncertain risks of terrible losses, exhibit maximin preferences.  
On those assumptions, the wholesale adoption of very liberal pleading and 
summary judgment standards gives an enormous windfall to liberal egalitarians, 
who see procedure through the prism of protection for the least well off. But very 
liberal pleading or summary judgment standards also create an intolerably uncertain 
risk of very bad outcomes for efficiency-minded welfare utilitarians and for strict 
egalitarians who abhor imposing a disproportionate risk of error on any group of 
litigants, including corporate defendants.  
Opaque formulations of summary judgment and pleading standards—like the 
“metaphysical doubt” standard in the Celotex trilogy, or “plausibility” in 
Twombly—trim between the competing claims of these different visions. By 
embracing a degree of legal uncertainty, the Supreme Court creates space for some 
lower courts to continue applying pleading and summary judgment standards quite 
liberally, giving liberal egalitarians some of what they want. But, that uncertainty 
also creates space for other courts to take less liberal approaches, which in turn 
hedges against the intolerably uncertain risk of very bad outcomes that the 
wholesale adoption of very liberal standards (and other determinate formulations) 
threatens for adherents of competing visions of procedural justice. 
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This is a possible basis for defending these decisions. Even if the various 
assumptions underpinning the argument are accepted, is this a normative case that 
anyone would want to accept? At one level, the simple answer is: of course. There 
are pluralist judges who embrace uncertainty for pluralist ends—Hand, who 
counseled leaving especially contentious legal problems to be “worked out without 
authoritative solution,”306 or Rehnquist, the “ultrapluralist” who refused to impose a 
“general methodology across the board” in the face of deeply divisive issues.307 
But if the question is taken more broadly to mean, “is this a vision many would 
accept?,” pluralists have to concede their claims are, and are likely to remain, 
deeply controversial—and for reasons that are easy to understand. The pluralist 
case for minimalism embraces “inconsistency in principle” and therefore lacks 
what Ronald Dworkin calls “integrity.”308 A pluralist Court must seem to “endorse 
principles to justify part of what [lower courts] ha[ve] done” that it must seem to 
“reject to justify the rest.”309 
In this, pluralist uses of minimalism go farther than even traditional democracy-
reinforcing justifications for minimalism, which are also pilloried as unprincipled. 
Democracy-reinforcing accounts hold out democratic deliberation as a deus ex 
machina, which will transmogrify current disagreement into a democratically 
achieved consensus—to which judges can then safely conform the law. In the 
pluralist view, there is no such comforting story to tell; conflict and disagreement 
are always with us, and, sometimes, in the face of it, neutral-minded courts have no 
choice but to create and live, indefinitely, with legal uncertainty, for the sake of a 
Solomonic, essentially political, compromise. 
Many are deeply wedded to a role for principles and integrity in legal decision 
making, and “trying to get someone to believe something whether he wants to 
believe it or not,” as Robert Nozick says, “is not . . . a nice way to behave.”310 I will 
not try—but I will give pluralists the last word. 
The key question for pluralists is “integrity to what”? Pluralists do claim 
integrity to a principle—the principle of mutual respect for contending interests. 
Moreover, they can reasonably claim that our law-making system is organized 
around that principle. Supermajority systems, after all, are deeply pluralistic—
designed to hedge against losses for competing interest groups with conflicting 
preferences, by promoting compromise that gives each group some of what it 
wants, in the face of intractable disagreement on matters of principle, often at the 
price of clarity in the law.311 Our modern procedural rule-making system, which is 
also designed to promote compromise between conflicting interests, replicates that 
emphasis.312  
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When, in turn, no group is able to enact its preferences, appellate courts that side 
with one group over others in the course of interpreting ambiguous statutes, or 
procedural rules, short-circuit the protections that system affords each group. 
Justifying a judicial choice to do so based on “integrity” seems, in turn, misplaced. 
Courts that impose one set of preferences, in the face of intractable disagreement, 
may show partisan “integrity.” But, they do so at the price of sacrificing their 
institutional integrity as honest brokers in a system built on accommodating—and 
compromising between—different versions of the good. 
